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The problem of effectively maintaining surface ships without sacrifice to 
operational availability and expected service life is receiving considerable attention from 
Navy leadership. The balance of cost, schedule, and performance parameters associated 
with ship maintenance is critical to ensure Naval surface force readiness requirements can 
be achieved within acceptable life-cycle costs. This thesis examines facets of U.S. Navy 
surface ship maintenance policy including condition-based maintenance and reliability-
centered maintenance (RCM). Analysis and recommendations for improvement of the 
main gas turbine exhaust system maintenance strategy are the focus of this thesis. The 
analysis recommends a new hybrid approach to RCM. The hybrid RCM concept blends 
an inspection task with a repair task based on historical failure data analysis. The hybrid 
preventative maintenance task recognizes and mitigates the interrelated, 
multidimensional issues associated with ship maintenance. To decompose and cognize 
the complexities woven into improving a surface ship system maintenance strategy, 
systems engineering concepts and applications are introduced and demonstrated. The 
Navy Standard Titanium Centrifugal Pump serves as a reference system to demonstrate 
the application of functional decomposition, fault tree analysis, and risk assessment. 
These concepts and applications provide a logical means to identify and manage 
challenges associated with developing effective system maintenance strategies. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The national security and prosperity of the United States is strongly dependent on 
maintaining dominance over the waterways throughout the world. Attaining such 
dominance requires a technically advanced Navy with a global presence. Building and 
operating a formidable naval surface force is an undertaking of enormous proportion. 
Nevertheless, a supreme naval force will not endure without the necessary maintenance 
to sustain its force structure. Further, unless the maintenance is effective and efficient, 
sustaining a sizeable naval force will become cost prohibitive and yield insufficient 
operational readiness. The United States depends on its in-service surface ships to remain 
operationally relevant and capable throughout their expected service lives. Seventy-five 
percent of the Navy’s 306-ship goal is already in today’s fleet and it is critical that these 
ships maintain required operational readiness to meet projected missions (Naval Sea 
Systems Command 2009b). Sustaining today’s fleet demands judicious and disciplined 
management of maintenance and modernization resources.  
This thesis examines existing Navy maintenance policies, programs, practices, 
and processes to identify maintenance strategy and operational requirement 
misalignments. System maintenance strategies play a direct role in the success or failure 
of ship maintenance availabilities. An effective surface ship maintenance strategy is an 
important aspect of maintaining ships, whereby expected service life within acceptable 
life cycle costs is achievable, without sacrifice to maintenance schedule constraints 
critical to operational readiness. Balancing cost, schedule, and performance associated 
maintenance parameters is determined to be a critical focus of the Navy maintenance 
community. This balance is also found to be of significant importance to future Navy 
force structure and stability of the private industrial bases. Additionally, the Navy gives 
carefully consideration to sequestration and execution of the Optimal Fleet Response 
Plan (OFRP), which is determined to underscore the importance of successful completion 
of ship maintenance availabilities within budget and schedule.  
The consequences of growth and new work are found to be the principal catalysts 
that drive increased costs and lost operational and training days (Commander, Naval 
 xx 
Surfaces Forces 2014). This thesis emphasizes the importance of controlling growth and 
new work to reduce the risk of maintenance availability cost and schedule growth. This 
thesis posits a systems engineering approach to aid the complex decision-making process 
of ship maintenance. Systems engineering concepts and applications are introduced and 
provide a logical means to identify and manage challenges associated with the analysis 
and development of effective surface ship system maintenance strategies. A description 
of the Navy standard titanium centrifugal pump (NSTCP) serves as a simple reference 
system to demonstrate the application of various systems engineering tools. The core of 
this thesis focuses on leveraging systems engineering applications and principles, such as 
functional decomposition, reliability block diagrams (RBD), fault tree analysis (FTA), 
context diagrams, and risk assessment to develop a structured systems engineering 
approach for more effective maintenance decisions.  
The principal focus of this thesis is the preventative maintenance (PM) strategy 
analysis and recommendations for improvement for the CG-47 Class main gas turbine 
exhaust system. Navy reliability-centered maintenance (RCM), condition-based 
maintenance (CBM) policies, and historical maintenance inspection data related to the 
main gas turbine exhaust system is analyzed. This thesis finds a new hybrid approach to 
RCM that is modifiable and in harmony with existing Navy maintenance policies. The 
hybrid exhaust system maintenance strategy is the product of careful evaluation of 
existing maintenance challenges, requirements and stakeholder analysis, and systems 
thinking. The analysis finds the existing strategy inadequately accounts for maintenance 
availability schedule constraints critical to future Navy operations. The new 
recommended hybrid approach mitigates shortfalls with existing condition-directed (CD) 
and failure-finding (FF) RCM methods that leave exposure to the risks of growth-work 
associated with availability schedule overruns. A hybrid preventative maintenance 
approach that combines the necessity of a FF task with the practicality of a TD task 
creates the sensibility of a blended inspection task with a planned and budgeted repair 
task. This hybrid approach to RCM for the main gas turbine exhaust system, backed by 
historical failure data analysis, presents an opportunity to improve maintenance planning 
and execution effectiveness. The historical failure data analysis provides sufficient 
 xxi 
evidence to justify a directed repair action. Moreover, accomplishing the FF element of 
the hybrid preventative maintenance task provides the necessary data for future analysis 
and amendment. Adjusting the TD task to be made more or less conservative according 
to historical inspection data analysis is a simple modification. The analysis is shown to be 
extrapolatable into a comprehensive maintenance strategy for surface ships that delivers 





LIST OF REFERENCES 
Commander, Naval Surfaces Forces. 2014. Vision for the 2026 Surface Fleet. San Diego, 
CA: Naval Surfaces Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 3. 
Naval Sea Systems Command. 2009b. Strategic Business Plan: 2009–2013. Washington, 
DC: Naval Sea Systems Command, 11. 
U.S. Fleet Forces Command. 2013. COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4790.3: Joint Fleet 
Maintenance Manual (JFFM). Rev C, Change 1. Vol. II. Manual. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Fleet Forces Command. 
  
 xxii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xxiii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to extend my gratitude to those who supported me in completing this 
thesis and the PD21 program. My completion of this thesis and master’s degree could not 
have been accomplished without the support of my command and supervisor, Kevin 
Campbell. Thank you for tolerating my time away from work to research, study, and 
write. I must also give a well-deserved thanks to Dave Bowe, my colleague and fellow 
classmate, for his motivation and wisdom throughout this journey. 
I would like to thank the wonderful Naval Postgraduate School instructors and 
staff, who carefully and effectively delivered the course material in a relevant and 
practical fashion. I give special thanks to my thesis advisors, Professors Gary Langford 
and Gregory Miller, for their helpful feedback and guidance throughout the development 
of my thesis. 
I cannot express enough thanks to my children. To Jackson and Tyler, thank you 
for allowing me time away from you to complete my studies. You deserve a pool in the 
backyard! Thanks to my parents, Dan and Cheryl Sparks, as well. The countless times 
you kept the children during our hectic schedules will not be forgotten. 
Finally, to my caring, loving, beautiful, and supportive wife, Amber: my deepest 
gratitude. Your encouragement during the intense and stressful moments is much 
appreciated and cherished. It was a great comfort and relief to know that you were willing 
to provide management of our household activities while I completed my school 








An effective surface ship maintenance strategy is an important aspect of 
maintaining ships, whereby expected service life within acceptable life cycle costs is 
achievable, without sacrifice to maintenance schedule constraints critical to operational 
readiness. According to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), “Navy 
ship maintenance policies and actions are designed to ensure crew and ship safety while 
achieving desired operational readiness levels at the lowest possible total ownership cost, 
consistent with public law and other directives” (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
2010a, 2). This thesis examines facets of the Navy’s surface ship maintenance policies 
and practices related to system maintenance strategy development. Systems engineering 
concepts and applications are introduced and demonstrated as a logical means to identify 
and manage strategy challenges. The principal focus of this thesis is the main gas turbine 
exhaust system maintenance strategy specific to the CG-47 Ticonderoga Class Cruiser. 
The purpose of this thesis is to emphasize systems thinking and systems engineering 
applications beneficial to system maintenance strategy development, and recommend an 
improved main gas turbine exhaust system maintenance strategy.  
A. OVERVIEW 
The Navy’s surface ship maintenance community has an enduring objective to 
provide “the right maintenance at the right time for the right price” (U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command 2013, II-II–2-7). This relatively straightforward objective has proven difficult 
to achieve and even more difficult to measure. The difficulty in consistently achieving 
this objective is an outgrowth of a large number of dynamic environmental variables that 
affect ship maintenance and modernization. These variables range from the size of the 
national defense budget that directly impacts funding allocation for ship maintenance, to 
the creation and implementation of a single new maintenance process, which impacts 
how and what kind of maintenance is executed. Failing to accomplish the effective and 
efficient maintenance drives inefficiencies in cost, schedule, and performance during ship 
maintenance availabilities. Growth and new work are the principal catalysts that drive 
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increased costs and lost operational and training days (Commander, Naval Surfaces 
Forces 2014). It is difficult for maintenance budgets and operational schedules to account 
for growth and new work accurately. Consequently, to achieve ship readiness in the face 
of inefficiencies, occasional extraordinary efforts are required. These inefficiencies yield 
unsustainable material readiness that inevitably negatively correlates with Navy force 
structure goals. Surface ship maintenance and modernization is a complex undertaking 
with numerous stakeholders. The Budget Control Act of 2011, most commonly referred 
to as sequestration, presents a new set of unique challenges to the Navy’s ability to 
deliver ready warships capable of providing sustained combat operations around the 
world.  
This thesis analyzes the existing preventative maintenance (PM) strategy of the 
CG-47 Class main gas turbine exhaust system in Chapters II and IV. The maintenance 
strategy analysis emphasizes why systems engineering applications can help improve 
maintenance planning and execution. Chapter III of this thesis explains the concept of 
reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) and the Navy’s condition-based maintenance 
(CBM) policy. Chapter IV introduces and demonstrates how the concept of systems 
thinking and systems engineering applications can help develop improved maintenance 
strategies in harmony with maintenance and operational community stakeholder 
requirements. The description of the Navy standard titanium centrifugal pump (NSTCP) 
serves as a simple reference system to introduce and demonstrate the application of 
various systems engineering tools. The core of this thesis focuses on leveraging systems 
engineering applications and principles—such as functional decomposition, reliability 
block diagrams (RBD), fault tree analyses (FTA), context diagrams, and risk 
assessments—to develop a structured systems engineering approach for more effective 
maintenance decisions. Chapter IV also provides a systems engineering analysis of the 
main gas turbine exhaust system using some of the systems engineering tools introduced 
earlier in the chapter. Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations based on the 
findings of the main gas turbine exhaust system analysis from Chapter IV. This thesis 
posits a systems engineering approach to aid the complex decision-making process of 
ship maintenance. The analysis can be extrapolated into a comprehensive maintenance 
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strategy for surface ships that addresses fundamental risks associated with ship 
maintenance execution, such as growth-work. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Surface ship maintenance is bound by the Department of the Navy budget. 
Funding constraints are a natural reality of any budget. To meet defined goals and 
objectives within a budget requires persistent and disciplined management of finite 
resources. When Rear Admiral Philip Cullom (2009, 8–9) testified before the Readiness 
Subcommittee on Armed Services on March 25, 2009, he stated the Navy’s 30-year 
shipbuilding plan and sustainment of a forward-deployed, surge-capable naval force is 
dependent on each class of surface ships reaching their respective service lives.  
For the Navy to maintain combat-ready surface ships fully through their expected 
service lives, the right maintenance and modernization is vital. Reaching expected service 
life does not happen by accident; a well-integrated systems engineering approach is 
critical to the development, planning, and execution of the right maintenance over a 
ship’s lifetime. A technical underpinning to executing the right system maintenance is the 
maintenance strategy. This thesis investigates methods to select the most effective main 
gas turbine exhaust system maintenance strategy for the CG-47 Class Cruiser. The 
following questions are addressed. 
• What set of factors influences selecting the most effective main gas 
turbine exhaust system maintenance strategy? 
• What does effective mean? 
• What are the measures of effectiveness? 
• How important are surface ship maintenance and modernization to 
achieving Navy force structure goals? 
• What are the driving issues? 
• What are the sensitivities? 
• What does the current process for developing a surface ship maintenance 
strategy look like? 
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• Do any quantitative system models exist today to aid in ship maintenance 
strategy?  
• How effective are these models? 
• What systems engineering applications or principles can be applied to 
improve the effectiveness of maintenance strategies? 
• What is the impact of not selecting the right maintenance or modernization 
strategy? 
C. BACKGROUND 
By all measures, dominance over the world’s oceans and major waterways is 
critical to the United States’ national security and prosperity (U.S. Navy 2014). In 
perspective, oceans are the lifeblood of the planet and its entire population. The National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2013 mentions that navigable oceans 
encompass over 70 percent of the earth’s surface. Additionally, in excess of 80 percent of 
the world’s population lives within 100 miles of an ocean and greater than 90 percent of 
the world’s commerce travels via ocean.1 The same NDAA confirms the national security 
of the United Sates is closely coupled to its strategic and commercial interests, and both 
require unfettered global access. 
To ensure global access to vital sea lanes, the United States strategically deploys 
forces from the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard to protect its interests at 
home and abroad. To defend waterways adequately around the world, the National 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2013 states the government must continue to 
build and deliver new ships, as well as ensure in-service ships achieve their designed 
service life goals. Between surface ship recapitalization and repair, the latter is of 
significant importance and the focus of this thesis.  
 
                                                 
1 Statistics can be found in National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013: Conference 
Report (to Accompany H.R. 4310). House of Representatives, 112th Cong., 2 (2012), 315. 
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1. Importance of Ship Maintenance and Modernization to Sustaining 
Force Structure 
The Department of the Navy (DON) report to Congress on the annual long-range 
plan for construction of naval vessels for fiscal year 2014 (Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations (Integration of Capabilities and Resources) [N8] 2013, 3) details the number 
of ships by platform in accordance with the 2012 Navy force structure assessment (FSA). 
This determination of ships is based on the Secretary of Defense’s 2012 (Panetta 2012) 
Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global 
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. The shipbuilding plan outlines a long-
range projection of new ship acquisition and associated resources required to develop a 
fleet that meets the FSA’s requirements. The Navy’s FSA in 2012 determined a force of 
306 ships needed to fulfill the National Security Strategy (NSS) requirements. This 
requirement of 306 ships includes the following. 
• 12 fleet ballistic missile submarines 
• 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers 
• 48 nuclear-powered attack submarines 
• 0 nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines 
• 88 large, multi-mission, surface combatants 
• 52 small, multi-role, surface combatants 
• 33 amphibious landing ships 
• 29 combat logistics force ships 
• 33 support vessels (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Integration of 
Capabilities and Resources) [N8] 2013, 12–14). 
Statistics from the official website of the U.S. Navy indicate today’s deployable 
battle force is 273 warships (United Sates Navy 2015). Sustaining today’s fleet is 
essential to the Navy’s ability to achieve the required FSA of 306 ships. Building new 
ships alone is not an economical or practical option. The Naval Sea Systems Command 
Strategic Business Plan emphasizes that seventy-five percent of the Navy’s 306-ship goal 
is already in today’s fleet and it is critical that these ships maintain required operational 
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readiness to meet projected missions (Naval Sea Systems Command 2009b, 6). 
Sustaining today’s fleet demands judicious and disciplined management of maintenance 
and modernization resources. Balancing all facets of cost, schedule, and performance for 
in-service surface ship maintenance necessitates a systems thinking approach. Ignoring 
one or more of these facets leads to unbalanced requirements and inefficiencies. 
2. Surface Ship Maintenance Budget in Perspective 
The Navy is a large, global, complex organization. In a speech to the Surface 
Navy Association in 2013, Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus (2013) stated if the DON 
were a privately held company, it would be the second largest in the world by employees. 
In the same speech, he mentioned that as a privately held company, the Navy would be 
the third largest in the world by assets and it would be the fifth largest in the world by 
budget or revenue authority (1).  
Funding resources for the maintenance and modernization of surface ships 
compete against other Navy budget requirements. To maintain surface ships capable of 
sustained combat operations, funds are allocated via the DON budget. These funds come 
from two predominant funding lines, Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N), and 
Other Procurement, Navy (OPN). The Under Secretary of Defense’s (Comptroller) DOD 
Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request Overview from March 2014 outlines the President’s 
request to Congress for $495.6 billion in discretionary funding for the base budget of the 
Department of Defense (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comproller)/Chief 
Financial Officer 2014, 1). In a presentation on the FY2015 President’s Budget, Rear 
Admiral Lescher (2014, 5) shows the DON’s portion of the budget consists of $148 
billion of the total DOD budget, or approximately 30 percent. The same presentation 
shows O&M,N and OPN constitute $46.8 billion and $6 billion of the DON budget, 
respectively (see Figure 1). Funding for surface ship maintenance and modernization 
represents only a portion of the overall O&M,N and OPN funds and competes against 
carrier, submarine, and Navy aircraft readiness requirements. Approximately $2 billion of 
the $11.2 billion O&M,N funds are dedicated to surface ship maintenance (Commander, 
Naval Surfaces Forces Pacific 2015; Commander, Naval Surfaces Forces Atlantic 2015). 
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Figure 1.  Summary by Appropriation Group FY 2015 Base Budget  
 
From Lescher, William, K. 2014. “Department of the Navy FY 2015 President's Budget.” 
Financial Management and Comptroller. 5. http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/15pres 
/DON_PB15_Press_Brief.pdf. 
3. Complexity of Ship Maintenance 
The complexity of surface ship maintenance extends well beyond the intricate 
design of a ship or individual work specification for repair. As indicated in a Surface 
Team One (ST1) presentation by Rear Admiral Dave Gale (2011, 2), surface ship 
maintenance is a multifaceted domain that must account for 12 ship classes, over 160 
ships, nine homeports around the world, six multi-ship multi-option (MSMO) prime 
contract holders, 19 MSMO contracts, frequent military personnel turnover, multiple 
processes, multiple databases, and many commands with unique organizational 
processes. A surface ship creates a demanding environment for executing repairs. Careful 
planning is required to account for work package integration, interference removal, 
support services, pier laydown, material procurement, and shipyard workload capacities 
to name a few. Recognizing the complexities of surface ship maintenance gives credence 
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to the necessity of a systems engineering approach to systematically managing the 
various components of ship repair. A traditional engineering approach lays out a plan that 
does not recognize fully (or accept as a premise) the interrelated, multidimensional issues 
of cost, schedule, and performance associated with ship maintenance. System engineering 
principles, such as requirements analysis focus on the intricacies of balancing cost, 
schedule, and performance. A systems engineering approach is especially helpful in 
developing an accurate work specification that defines the right scope of work. The 
absence of a disciplined tactic to work specification development breeds growth and new 
work.  
4. Systems Engineering Relevance to Maintenance Strategy 
Development 
A precise definition of a system is yet to be universally agreed upon. Langford 
(2012, 202) defines a system as, “a bounded, stable group of objects exhibiting intrinsic 
emergent properties that through the interactions of energy, matter, material wealth, and 
information provide functions different from their archetypes.” Objects can include 
people, services, software, policies, hardware, processes, and documents. The 
development of a maintenance strategy for a system designed for a surface ship requires 
the interaction of people (maintenance community), facilities (repair facilities), policies 
(maintenance, regulatory), processes (budget and schedule), software (databases), and 
hardware (tools, test equipment). Thus, a maintenance strategy developed via the 
interaction of objects that delivers the function, performance, and quality needed by the 
customer that is beyond what the individual objects provide, is a system. 
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) (2015) defines 
systems engineering on their official website as “an engineering discipline whose 
responsibility is creating and executing an interdisciplinary process to ensure that the 
customer and stakeholder’s needs are satisfied in a high quality, trustworthy, cost 
efficient and schedule compliant manner throughout a system’s entire life cycle.” The 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook for Systems Engineering says, “systems engineering 
establishes the technical framework for delivering material capabilities to the warfighter” 
(Department of Defense 2013, 2). The same source goes on to say, “systems engineering 
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ensures the effective development and delivery of capability (maintenance strategy) 
through the implementation of a balanced approach with respect to cost, schedule, 
performance, and risk using integrated, disciplined, and consistent system engineering 
activities and processes regardless of when a program enters the acquisition life cycle” 
(Department of Defense 2013, 3). The practice of systems engineering is composed of 
technical processes and technical management processes, as seen in Figure 2.  
Figure 2.  Systems Engineering Processes  
 
From Department of Defense. 2013. Defense Acquisition Guidebook—Systems 
Engineering. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 8. 
The Defense Acquisition Guide Book for Systems Engineering claims, “the 
ultimate purpose of the systems engineering processes is to provide the framework that 
allows the systems engineering team to efficiently and effectively deliver a capability to 
satisfy a validated operational need” (Department of Defense 2013, 6). A system 
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maintenance strategy is a valid operational need. This thesis shows how systems 
engineering principles can guide in the development of system maintenance strategies in 
Chapter IV. This thesis conceives systems engineering methodology is a logical tactic to 
aid in the development of system maintenance strategies. The comprehensive and 
methodical approach characteristic to systems engineering is ideal for breaking down 
complex issues and aligning maintenance requirements with maintenance business 
practices, processes, life cycle costs, schedule constraints, and customer and stakeholder 
needs to create an effective maintenance strategy.  
The surface ship maintenance community is not immune to the challenges of 
balancing cost, schedule, and performance in their mission to support a fluid demand of 
ready warships by their Combatant Commander (CCDR) customers. Langford (2012, 
215–216) explains,  
Systems engineering is challenged to address two seemingly different 
types of problems—those that are defined in terms of requirements (for 
customers who have specific needs) and those that are driven by the 
economics of services (those who want to lower costs and improved 
schedule). Systems engineering provides the thinking and the approach to 
establishing performance, cost, and schedule trade-offs that align to 
requirements. Systems engineers deliver their most beneficial performance 
on problems whose boundaries (physical, functional, and behavioral) 
reach well beyond what is often presented in a set of requirements.  
The integration of maintenance requirements, stakeholder and customer needs, 
operational requirements, business practices, and resources is the basis for an effective 
system maintenance strategy, and the strength of systems engineering is integration.  
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study provides for a more predictable and well-rounded maintenance 
requirement through the application of systems engineering analysis of historical 
maintenance data and the concept of systems thinking and best value engineering. The 
resulting maintenance strategy can be adjusted over time to account for data variation. A 
data-supported directed maintenance requirement allows for more accurate planning, 
material forecasting, reduced growth and new work, and better supports a firm fixed price 
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contract strategy. A systems engineering analysis of historical maintenance data provides 
an alternative to condition-based maintenance assessments. A sizeable reduction in time 
and resources currently expended on condition-based maintenance assessments required 
to define the scope of repair may be realized. A systems engineered maintenance strategy 
brings efficiency to ship repair and helps to ensure finite resources are properly applied.  
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis introduces systems engineering applications beneficial to system 
maintenance strategy analysis and development. Reference to the NSTCP provides 
context for the systems engineering tools described in this thesis and a basic illustration 
of their application relevant to maintenance strategy analysis. This thesis then analyzes 
the main gas turbine exhaust system using systems engineering applications. The analysis 
of the main gas turbine exhaust system is limited to the CG-47 Ticonderoga Class Cruiser 
configuration. The methodology of this thesis focuses on a systematic approach that 
leverages various reliability analysis applications and processes common to the field of 
systems engineering. Actual data and metrics are used to the maximum extent possible. 
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II. THE RIGHT MAINTENANCE, AT THE RIGHT TIME, FOR 
THE RIGHT PRICE 
A well-engineered system maintenance strategy is an important part of executing 
disciplined and effective maintenance. The development of such a maintenance strategy 
necessitates a comprehensive understanding of the system, its functions, boundaries, and 
interactions. Further, the development or improvement of a system maintenance strategy 
must be in harmony with other related Navy strategies, such as contracting and logistics. 
An effective system maintenance strategy must account for established Navy 
maintenance policies, processes, practices, and programs. System maintenance strategy 
development requires an analysis of the associated maintenance community stakeholders 
and elements of each of the aforementioned factors.  
A. MAINTENANCE COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
The various stakeholders that comprise the maintenance community influence the 
scope, periodicity, and price of ship maintenance. It is important to recognize 
stakeholder’s perspectives, needs, motives, interests, requirements, and values when 
analyzing existing or developing new maintenance requirements. Often times, not all 
stakeholders are considered or fully evaluated. Failing to recognize stakeholders and fully 
evaluate their perspectives, needs, motives, interests, requirements, and values may result 
in insufficient understanding and appreciation of stakeholder’s concerns and the 
development of an inadequate maintenance strategy. According to Langford (2012, 260), 
“stakeholder analysis is the systematic gathering and analyzing of qualitative information 
to determine whose interests should be taken into account when developing and/or 
implementing a policy or program.” Reviewing documented group and organization 
mission descriptions is one means of identifying relevant stakeholders and their interests. 
The maintenance community comprises stakeholders from various commands and 
organizations, each with unique roles and responsibilities. A discussion of key 
stakeholders within the maintenance community and their applicable roles and 
responsibilities follows. These stakeholders directly influence all aspects of ship 
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maintenance including policy, process, programs, procedures, budget, and strategy. Many 
additional stakeholders influence or are influenced by surface ship maintenance not 
mentioned in this analysis. Additional stakeholders, such as sailor’s families, 
congressional representatives, and the general taxpayer, are not considered directly part 
of the maintenance community, and therefore, are outside the scope of this analysis. 
1. Type Commander 
The mission of the Type Commander (TYCOM) is described in their mission, 
functions, and tasks instruction (Commander, United States Pacific Fleet 2013, 2) as 
“supporting Combatant Commanders and Navy Component Commanders by providing 
combat-ready Naval Surface Forces which are forward deployable, fully trained, properly 
manned, capably equipped, well maintained, and combat-sustainable.” The TYCOM has 
delegated responsibility and authority provided by the respective Fleet Commander for 
whom they represent. OPNAV states that the TYCOM is responsible to support their 
respective Fleet Commander with combat-ready forces via administrative management of 
force-wide plans, concepts, and policies (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2010b, 
4). As such, the TYCOM has a vested interest in surface ship maintenance and a laser 
focus on executing all the necessary maintenance on time and on budget. The successful 
completion of maintenance availabilities on schedule is significantly important to the 
TYCOM to ensure sufficient time is allowed for the required training cycle prior to a 
ship’s deployment. Curbing maintenance growth and new work is also essential to the 
TYCOM. Preventing excessive growth and new work is essential to the preservation of 
limited maintenance funds and associated negative impacts resonating across other 
budgeted ship maintenance availabilities. 
2. Naval Sea Systems Command 
The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) is the largest of all the system 
commands (SYSCOMs). The mission of NAVSEA is to “design, build, deliver, and 
maintain ships and systems on time and on cost for the U.S. Navy” (Naval Sea Systems 
Command 2009b, 3). The NAVSEA mission is executed across a series of directorates 
within the overall organization. The NAVSEA directorates are responsible for such areas 
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as developing maintenance and engineering policy, providing independent technical and 
contractual authority, developing and executing surface ship modernization, and life 
cycle sustainment. The success of surface ship maintenance and modernization depends 
on the foundation of processes, policies, programs, and procedures built by NAVSEA.  
3. Regional Maintenance Center 
The joint fleet maintenance manual (JFFM) defines the regional maintenance 
center (RMC) as “the command with overall responsibility for efficient planning and 
execution of all ship maintenance and modernization for assigned ships in its Area of 
Responsibility (AOR). The RMC is a subordinate command to NAVSEA and has a 
reporting relationship to the appropriate TYCOM to ensure the TYCOM can effectively 
carry out their responsibilities relating to material readiness of their ships” (U.S. Fleet 
Forces Command 2013, II-II–1-1). Additionally, the RMC is generally designated as the 
Naval Supervisory Authority (NSA) by the TYCOM. The JFFM describes the NSA as 
“the single Naval activity responsible for the integration, oversight and verification of all 
work accomplished by all activities (i.e., Naval Shipyards (NSY), Regional Maintenance 
Centers (RMC), Supervisors of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) contractors, Type Commander 
(TYCOM) sponsored contractors, Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMA), Alteration 
Installation Teams (AIT) and Ship’s Force) working within the assigned availability, and 
acts as the single point of contact for this work” (U.S. Fleet Forces Command 2013, II-I–
2-2). 
4. Commander, Naval Regional Maintenance Center 
The official homepage for Commander, Naval Regional Maintenance Center 
(CNRMC) says its mission is “to deliver quality and affordable material readiness to 
support U.S. Naval forces worldwide” (Commander, Naval Regional Maintenance Center 
2009). CNRMC is an organization under NAVSEA and provides direct oversight and 
alignment for each of the RMCs. 
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5. Private Ship Repair Industry 
This industry is a collection of qualified Master Ship Repair Agreement (MSRA) 
eligible contractors. According to the MSRA, these private industrial activities must have 
the capability to execute the majority of a maintenance work package within their own 
facility without the support of additional shops or work force. These activities must also 
be capable of subcontracting for augmented support when internal capability and capacity 
are exceeded. MSRA contractors are liable for developing and managing a master 
integrated schedule, cost, and performance of subcontractors (Commander, Naval Sea 
Systems Command 1996, 9). The private ship repair industry is a vital component of the 
surface Navy. A symbiotic relationship exists between the surface Navy and private ship 
repair industry, neither of which could survive without the other. Private industrial 
activities must competitively compete for ship repair work. For this reason, private 
shipyards have a keen awareness for executing maintenance within established 
contractual parameters. Private ship repair activities are for profit organizations and 
responsible to their shareholders. To achieve company goals and ensure longevity, they 
must establish strong working relationships with the surface Navy and a record of strong 
performance. 
6. Naval Supply Systems Command 
The Naval Supply Systems Command’s (NAVSUP) official homepage defines 
the naval supply system’s responsibility “to deliver sustained global logistics and quality-
of-life support to the Navy and Joint warfighter” (Naval Supply Systems Command 
2015). NAVSUP provides supply support for the weapons systems throughout the Navy. 
Maintenance strategies that touch the way supply system material is provided for ship 
maintenance is important to NAVSUP.  
7. Fleet Commanders 
The missions, functions, and tasks instruction for the Commander of the United 
States Pacific Fleet says, “the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) delegates authority to the 
Fleet Commanders to organize, man, train, equip, and maintain assigned Navy forces and 
shore activities to generate required levels of current and future fleet readiness” (Office 
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of the Chief of Naval Operations 2010b, 1). According to the same instruction, “the Fleet 
Commander is the budget submitting office (BSO) with financial management authority 
and responsibility for their assigned forces, shore activities, military and civilian 
personnel, infrastructure, and budget” (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2010b, 1). 
The Fleet Commander delegates certain responsibilities and authorities to the applicable 
surface ship TYCOM. Maintenance strategies that affect how surface ships are manned, 
trained, equipped, and maintained are of significant interest to the Fleet Commander.  
8. Sailors aboard Surface Platforms 
The primary mission for sailors aboard surfaces ships is to be capable of 
performing sustained combat operations and successfully meet all assigned operational 
requirements. To meet this objective, sailors are dependent in part on effective 
maintenance strategies to keep their ships materially ready to operate as designed. 
Moreover, sailors aboard surface ships are responsible for the planning and execution of 
organizational-level maintenance within their capacity to include planned maintenance 
and the requisitioning of necessary parts. Sailors are also responsible for preparing 
systems and equipment for intermediate or depot-level repair via proper system isolation, 
and tag out and ship compartment availability when required. According to the 
maintenance policy for U.S. Navy ships, “the Navy ship is a unique entity in that 
responsibility for both the operation and maintenance of the ship rests with the crew 
itself. Other Navy organizations exist to support that entity” (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations 2010b, 36). 
9. Naval Surface and Undersea Warfare Centers 
The official NAVSEA Warfare Center homepage describes the Naval Surface 
Warfare Center (NSWC) and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) enterprises. 
The homepage says the warfare centers provide the technical underpinnings needed to 
support the fleet. The homepage also says, “The Warfare Centers provide depot 
maintenance and in-service engineering support to ensure the systems fielded today 
perform consistently and reliably in the future” (Naval Surface Warfare Center 2015). 
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Warfare center activities must be knowledgeable of Navy system maintenance strategies 
and are directly involved in maintenance strategy development. 
10. Surface Team One 
The Surface Team One (ST1) charter signed by Admiral Hunt and Admiral 
Thomas in 2012 outlines the scope and purpose of the organization as “the unifying 
mechanism for getting to a coherent, comprehensive, and whole Surface Navy 
maintenance, modernization, and sustainment program” (Hunt and Thomas 2012, 2). The 
charter goes on to say, “ST1 provides a structure for the management and long-term 
systematic improvement of quality, schedule, and cost performance across the Surface 
Navy end-to-end process while defining, championing, and improving the processes in 
order to address the challenges of meeting surface ship expected service life as well as 
current readiness” (2). The charter highlights the importance for maintenance 
organizations to work seamlessly together across the end-to-end process. ST1 plays a 
direct role in the development and improvement of system maintenance strategies for 
Navy ships. 
11. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
U.S. Navy regulations state, “The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is the 
principal naval advisory and naval executive to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct 
of the naval activities of the Department of the Navy” (Department of the Navy 1990, 
24). The same source explains the CNO is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for 
the management of all naval operating forces and assigned shore activities. U.S. Navy 
regulations also say, “The CNO is responsible to organize, train, equip, prepare and 
maintain the readiness of Navy forces, including those for assignment to unified or 
specified commands, for the performance of military missions as directed by the 
President, the Secretary of Defense or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (Department 
of the Navy 1990, 24). Surface ship maintenance strategies are one of many factors 
important to OPNAV. 
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12. System or Equipment Original Equipment Manufacturer 
The original equipment manufacturer (OEM) designs, builds, and delivers 
commercial systems and equipment for installation on Navy surface ship platforms. The 
OEM develops initial technical provisioning documentation (TPD). TPD includes items, 
such as maintenance requirements and procedures, technical manuals, system or 
equipment drawings and schematics, and parts lists. In some cases, maintenance or repair 
may require special tooling or procedures only the OEM can provide. The OEM also 
designs and builds necessary upgrades to a system or equipment to improve design, 
prevent obsolescence, and keep pace with emerging technologies. The OEM is an 
important stakeholder throughout the life cycle of a system or equipment.  
B. THE RIGHT MAINTENANCE 
The right maintenance is the accomplishment of the correct maintenance action 
on the right system, subsystem, component, assembly, or sub assembly with the 
appropriate material and labor resources. RCM processes provide the technical 
underpinning for system and equipment maintenance requirements. RCM is an essential 
part of determining the right maintenance. RCM is discussed in Chapter III of this thesis. 
Development of a maintenance strategy that safeguards against accomplishing the wrong 
maintenance must ensure the maintenance is accomplished at the appropriate level. 
Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011) define maintenance level as a means to describe where 
maintenance is executed. They also explain that functions performed at different 
maintenance levels are determined by maintenance frequency and complexity, facility 
and supply chain requirements, and technician skill set requirements (76). The Navy has 
three core levels of maintenance: organizational, intermediate, and depot. Figure 3 
depicts the basic criteria and differences between the maintenance levels. 
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Figure 3.  System Operational and Maintenance Flow  
 
Blanchard, Benjamin S., and Wolter J. Fabrycky. 2011. Systems Engineering and 
Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
1. Levels of Maintenance 
a. Organizational Maintenance 
Organizational-level maintenance is considered ship’s force capable maintenance 
actions. Organizational-level maintenance accomplished correctly and without deferral 
prevents the escalation of minor defects from becoming major material problems with 
operational impacts. The CNO’s maintenance policy for U.S. Navy ships designates 
organizational-level maintenance actions to include facility maintenance, routine system 
and component planned maintenance, calibration, lubrication, and corrective maintenance 
commensurate with ship’s force capability and capacity (Chief of Naval Operations 2010, 
22).  
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b. Intermediate Maintenance 
The CNO’s maintenance policy for U.S. Navy ships defines intermediate-level 
maintenance to require technical capabilities, facilities, or capacities that fall between 
organizational-level and depot-level. Fleet Commanders assign the Fleet Maintenance 
Activity (FMA) or private shipyards to accomplish intermediate-level maintenance 
(Chief of Naval Operations 2010, 24). Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011, 78) describe 
typical intermediate-level maintenance actions to include detailed inspections and system 
checkout, major servicing, major equipment repair and modifications, complex 
adjustments, minor calibration, and overload from organizational-level maintenance.  
c. Depot-Level Maintenance 
Depot-level maintenance is the most complex of all the maintenance levels. 
Depot-level maintenance requires the technical expertise, larger more capable facilities, 
and increased capacities that accompany NSYs, private shipyards, OEMs, or NAVSEA 
designated overhaul points (DOPs) (Chief of Naval Operations 2010, 28). Typical depot-
level maintenance actions include complex equipment repairs and modifications, 
equipment overhaul and rebuild, detailed calibration, and intermediate-level maintenance 
beyond FMA capacity (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 78). Navy depot-level 
maintenance comprises a large portion of the critical maintenance and modernization 
required to sustain the fleet. Additionally, depot maintenance relies heavily on 
independent non-government entities.  
According to Admirals Mathews, Whitney, and Sohl (2013), the Navy’s Depot 
Maintenance Strategic Plan supports the National Defense Strategy, Navy Strategy and 
the DOD Depot Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plan. Implementation 
strategies are developed within the framework and guidelines of the overall Navy Depot 
Maintenance Strategic Plan (see Figure 4) (7). Each system command incorporates this 
strategy into its own strategic documents and associated implementation guidance. 
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Figure 4.  Strategic Plan Implementation 
 
From Mathews, Tim, Mark Whitney, and Paul Sohl. 2013. The United States Navy Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan. Washington, DC. 
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2. Current and Future Readiness Balancing Act 
In a budget and schedule constrained environment, the surface Navy must contend 
with striking the correct balance between current and future readiness. To satisfy current 
readiness expectations, a surface ship must be materially capable of meeting its designed 
mission requirements when operationally essential. A maintenance strategy with a bias 
towards a current readiness paradigm will focus on the material availability of critical 
systems and equipment needed for war fighting. A current readiness paradigm has the 
tendency to sacrifice the material readiness of slow-to-degrade systems in favor of 
current mission essential systems when cost and schedule are limited.  
In contrast, future readiness centers on maintenance tasks necessary for achieving 
a ship’s expected service live (ESL). The CNO says future readiness tasks aim to reduce 
out-year maintenance costs, minimize excessive and unplanned maintenance, and 
influence modernization and new construction budgets to correct maintenance shortfalls 
(Chief of Naval Operations 2013, 1). Future readiness tasks prevent slow-to-degrade 
systems such as ship structure from becoming an unmanageable current readiness 
problem. Neglect of essential future readiness efforts produces a bow wave of 
maintenance, increasing the total ownership cost (TOC) of a surface ship. Current 
readiness and future readiness are equally important to sustain a ship’s operational 
capability throughout its ESL. Systems design requirements, redundancy, and 
degradation characteristics are key elements of determining whether the system aligns 
with current or future readiness. Corrective maintenance for the repair of a fire pump 
needed to meet minimum fire protection and dewatering capability is considered a current 
readiness item. Corrective maintenance for the repair of a minor structural defect in a 
tank or gas turbine exhaust collector is considered a future readiness item. A maintenance 
strategy must appropriately account for both current and future readiness aspects.  
3. Class Maintenance Plan 
The development of a system maintenance strategy must be incorporated into the 
Class Maintenance Plan (CMP) for the applicable ship class. The CMP identifies all 
maintenance tasks, with periodicities, for a given class. The JFMM describes the CMP as 
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a database comprising organizational, intermediate and depot-level maintenance tasks. It 
identifies the specific nature of these tasks such as: “material condition assessment tasks 
(I-tasks), qualified repair and life renewal tasks (Q-tasks), availability routine tasks (R-
tasks), and authorized fleet and program modernization tasks” (U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command 2013, II-II–1-1). CMP tasks can be scheduled or unscheduled. The JFMM 
states that scheduled tasks consist of intermediate and depot-level tasks the cognizant 
technical authority requires to be accomplished on a specific periodicity (U.S. Fleet 
Forces Command 2013, II-II–1-1). The CMP system automatically sends scheduled tasks 
to the maintenance team (MT) for action based on accomplishment history and task 
frequency requirements. A MT has the ability to request a scheduled task to be 
accomplished before it has been sent to the current ship maintenance plan (CSMP). 
According to the JFMM, the MT must request unscheduled tasks. The JFMM goes on to 
list unscheduled tasks to include unscheduled assessment tasks, qualified repair tasks, and 
modernization items with related support and service tasks (U.S. Fleet Forces Command 
2013, II-II–1-1). 
4. Surface Ship Engineered Operating Cycle Program 
In May 2013, the CNO established the Surface Ship Engineered Operating Cycle 
(SSEOC) program. This program establishes the framework to identify, document, track, 
and execute maintenance tasks necessary for a ship to reach ESL (Chief of Naval 
Operations 2013, 1). SSEOC designated tasks consist of technically validated 
assessments and repairs considered critical to reducing unexpected corrective 
maintenance and future maintenance costs (Chief of Naval Operations 2013, 2). The 
SSEOC program includes the propulsion system under which main gas turbines reside.  
5. Maintenance Figure of Merit 2.0 
Surface Navy stakeholders committed significant resources to the development of 
a model capable of supporting a set of software applications called the Maintenance 
Figure of Merit (MFOM). According to the article, “Fleet-Oriented Maintenance Figure 
of Merit,” authored by several key architects of the model, MFOM was envisioned to be 
an objective ship material readiness reporting system (Hirschman et al. 2009, 1). In an 
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effort to develop the system, the Navy introduced the ship material condition metric 
model—Maintenance Figure of Merit (MFOM) 2.0. Schonberg (2013, 31) described 
MFOM as  
a computer-based tool built on a hierarchical structure that calculated 
material conditions against operational requirements. It was designed to 
consistently and objectively calculate a material readiness value for 
equipment, systems, tasks, and missions for the ship, providing the Navy 
maintenance community with a single authoritative, centrally managed 
application that contains the necessary to support readiness and 
maintenance reporting.  
MFOM 2.0 was also going to link cost to the calculated ship’s material readiness. 
Unfortunately, according to Schonberg (2013, 31), the MFOM development effort is 
reported to have failed due to rising costs, limited scope, disconnected maintenance 
processes, and data systems. MFOM 2.0 exists today in a limited capacity as “a web-
based software tool that operates on unclassified and classified networks both ashore and 
afloat” (Hirschman et al. 2009, 1). The tool is limited to basic existing maintenance 
documentation and reporting.  
C. MAINTENANCE TIMING AND SCHEDULE 
1. Optimal Fleet Response Plan 
The high operational tempo (OPTEMO) of Navy surface ships driven by 
Combatant Commander (CCDR) requests for global presence requires optimal 
scheduling. To maximize ship deployment and surge capability, the readiness generation 
process underpinning the fleet response plan (FRP) must be improved. Admirals Gortney 
and Harris (2014, 40) acknowledge negative trends in maintenance and modernization 
execution, training, deployment duration, and personnel turnover as unsustainable. The 
current FRP is characterized as lacking flexibility for changes in maintenance, training, 
and operational schedules and incapable of maximizing ship operational availability (40). 
This current FRP leads to the destabilization of maintenance schedules, shipyard loading, 
training, and Carrier Strike Group (CSG) composition. Furthermore, Admirals Gortney 
and Harris (2014) explain the lack of operational schedule predictability impacts sailors, 
their families, and the industrial base. Increased predictability, while enabling critical 
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adaptability for policy makers, is an important aspect of the Optimal Fleet Response Plan 
(OFRP) (40). 
Admiral Bill Gortney (2014, 6) presented the OFRP in January 2014 in which he 
described a fundamental guiding principle of the OFRP to be the alignment of cruiser and 
destroyer assignments to the CSGs to create a stable, predictable, and integrated 
maintenance and modernization schedule that helps both industry partners and sailors. 
Successful execution of OFRP demands strict adherence to a tightly controlled schedule. 
Maintenance availabilities forced to be extended due to growth and new work will result 
in failure of the OFRP model. For this reason, the maintenance community must focus on 
bringing increased predictability to ship maintenance to deliver the predictability 
envisioned via OFRP. The shift to OFRP with its success predicated on timely 
completion of maintenance availabilities raises the importance of schedule to a new level.  
2. Types of Maintenance Availabilities 
Development of a successful maintenance strategy goes beyond identifying the 
appropriate level of maintenance. The scope of maintenance coupled to a maintenance 
strategy requires the appropriate scheduled maintenance availability. The preponderance 
of surface ship maintenance is executed in scheduled CNO maintenance availabilities and 
continuous maintenance availabilities (CMAVs).  
A variety of CNO availability types exist to accommodate different levels of 
required maintenance. CNO correspondence on the subject says the CG-47 ship class 
follows an engineered operating cycle (EOC) (Chief of Naval Operations 2014b, 32–33). 
The same document describes EOC as a maintenance philosophy designed to sustain or 
improve ship material readiness and operational availability. This philosophy focuses on 
minimizing unnecessary time spent in depot-level availabilities and a structured 




• “Periodic inspection of selected systems and equipment to identify 
and document necessary repair requirements and material 
condition trends” 
• “Periodic maintenance tasks to be accomplished at specified times 
during the ship’s life cycle” 
• “Scheduled intra-cycle depot level intermediate maintenance 
availabilities, Docking Selected Restricted Availabilities (DSRA), 
and Selected Restricted Availabilities (SRA) to accomplish the 
maintenance and modernization required to sustain or improve the 
material condition of the ships”  
• “Extensive modernization to maintain and upgrade the ship class 
war fighting capability” (32–33) 
The description of different Navy maintenance availability types is outlined in the 
CNO’s report, Representative Intervals, Durations and Repair Mandays for Depot Level 
Maintenance Availabilities of U.S. Navy Ships. “Continuous maintenance (CM) includes 
limited scheduled depot-level maintenance conducted outside of CNO availabilities” 
(Chief of Naval Operations 2014b, 32). CM is typically scheduled for accomplishment in 
CMAVs with durations of approximately four weeks. Maintenance and modernization 
requiring an extensive industrial period are accomplished in SRAs. Extended SRAs 
(ESRAs) are scheduled to include maintenance and modernization that requires 
additional funding and schedule duration beyond a SRA. A SRA expanded to include 
maintenance and modernization that requires dry-docking is called a docking SRA 
(DSRA). Similar to an ESRA, extended DSRAs (EDSRAs) are scheduled to include 
maintenance and modernization that requires additional funding and schedule duration 
beyond a DSRA. Main gas turbine exhaust system repairs are generally scheduled for 
CNO availabilities unless emergent repairs are required.  
3. Matching Scope and Schedule 
Successful on-time completion of a maintenance availability schedule is highly 
dependent on correctly matching the scope of a maintenance package with the availability 
duration. This effort requires significant planning, attention to detail, and discipline to 
resist requirements creep. Nonetheless, a maintenance package inclusive of work items 
that require open and inspect tasks leaves the availability exposed to cost and schedule 
 28 
risk. An integrated master schedule (IMS) with a critical path at risk of being influenced 
by the results of open and inspect tasks is likely to be an ineffective schedule measure. A 
proactive schedule risk management plan (RMP) is limited in its ability to mitigate 
growth and new work for a large magnitude of potential critical path work. Definitive 
work specification predictability for potential critical path items is the best defense 
against cost and schedule risk. Consequently, maintenance strategies must be developed 
with the risk of potential growth and new work in mind.  
D. THE RIGHT PRICE 
The Navy maintenance community strives to balance cost with schedule and 
performance properly. Many factors that drive cost, such as competition and timely 
Congressional budget authorization, are beyond the influence of a system maintenance 
strategy and outside the scope of this thesis. However, executing maintenance at a fair 
and reasonable price is critical to ensuring sufficient resources are available to cover all 
planned and budgeted maintenance requirements. Inefficiently executed maintenance that 
yields growth and new work, puts maintenance requirements and the budget at risk. The 
maintenance strategy for a system directly influences the life cycle cost of that system. 
Furthermore, an engineered maintenance strategy that provides consistent, repeatable, 
and explicit directive specifications can be budgeted with a high degree of accuracy. A 
maintenance strategy of this nature can also be effectively planned and integrated, which 
in turn, drives down cost.  
The business and process of ship repair are very complex. The fundamental 
requirements for ship repair share similarities to shipbuilding. Peters’ article (2006, 15) 
on American shipbuilding states it is possible to extrapolate that successful ship repair is 
“simply bringing together the following elements in a coherent, planned way: a sound 
maintenance strategy (the product of engineering effort), necessary materials such as 
steel, pipe, and pumps (the product of a viable industrial base and second-tier suppliers), 
and a work force appropriately sized and with the right technical skills.” All the elements 
needed for industry to provide sustained successful ship repair hinge on stability. Peters’ 
(16) article emphasizes the ship repair industry requires workload stability to efficiently 
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hire, train and retain a capable workforce, plan the use of facilities, and keep 
subcontractor and supplier bases employed. 
The surface Navy is heavily dependent on the private industrial base for surface 
ship maintenance. Performance of the private ship repair industry directly influences the 
cost of ship maintenance. Positive ship repair industry performance requires effective 
planning, resource allocation, and project management. Establishing a stable predictable 
workload in a port improves industry workload forecasting capabilities and resource 
management. Logically, a system maintenance strategy that produces predictable and 
reliable maintenance requirements is a key ingredient to enabling the planning of labor, 
material, and facilities management. The collection of similar system maintenance 
strategies, planned and executed as a work package in ship maintenance availabilities, is 
a principal factor to generating industrial base stability and price efficiencies.  
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III. RELIABILITY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE  
All mechanical systems have components prone to material degradation resulting 
from wear, corrosion, or fatigue. Material degradation eventually leads to 
nonconformance from the original design specification. Unless acted upon, a 
nonconformance will progress until the system, or a related component, fails to meet the 
designed performance requirements. To disrupt the failure process of a system or part, 
scheduled maintenance is required. RCM is the technical methodology for the 
development of scheduled maintenance programs. Nowlan and Heap, considered the 
founders of the RCM concept, claim maintenance is accomplished based on three general 
hypotheses:  
• Hardware degrades with age 
• There is something that can be done to restore or maintain reliability 
• Efforts to restore or maintain reliability are cost effective (Commander, 
Naval Sea Systems Command 2007, 43) 
In more precise terms, Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011, 439) define RCM as a 
“systematic approach to developing a focused, effective, and cost-efficient preventative 
maintenance program and control plan for a system or product.” Blanchard and Fabrycky 
(439–440) proclaim the RCM technique as beneficial for developing new preventative 
maintenance programs during initial design and for evaluating existing preventative 
maintenance programs for improvement. Development of a preventative maintenance 
process during system design is referred to as the classic RCM process. The evaluation of 
preventative maintenance programs for existing systems is denoted as the backfit RCM 
process. The NAVSEA RCM handbook describes the backfit RCM process to include 
validation of existing maintenance tasks by using operations and maintenance data to 
correct task intervals and task content where appropriate (Commander, Naval Sea 
Systems Command 2007, 15). This thesis evaluates aspects of the backfit RCM process 
to improve the maintenance strategy of the CG-47 class main gas turbine exhaust system.  
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A. HISTORY OF RELIABILITY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE 
RCM has its roots in the airline industry. According to the NAVSEA handbook 
on RCM, “in 1967, the airline industry’s Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) first 
applied decision tree logic—a series of questions that lead to a supportable maintenance 
task decision—to the problem of identifying required preventive maintenance tasks” 
(Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 2007, 13). In the early 1970s, the airline 
industry’s work interested the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Naval Air Systems 
Command, the Air Force, and the Army. The RCM handbook claims Naval Air Systems 
Command as the first organization to apply the airline’s new philosophy. The handbook 
also attributes the same organization to be the initial architects for an improved 
methodology called RCM, which they applied to both new design and in-service aircraft 
(14). In 1978, the RCM methodology was outlined in a book published by United 
Airlines and sponsored by the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, 
Reserve Affairs and Logistics). The application of RCM to ship maintenance is derived 
from the book, Reliability-Centered Maintenance by Stanley Nowlan and Howard Heap 
(14).  
B. FUNDAMENTALS OF MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING AND 
RELIABILITY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE 
NAVSEA defines maintenance as the “set of actions taken to ensure that systems, 
equipment, and components provide their intended functions when required” 
(Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 2007, 33). The NAVSEA handbook states 
nine core principles of RCM govern the development, implementation, execution, and 
continuous improvement of ship maintenance programs. These nine basic principles are 
the following.  
• Failures happen   
• Failures can have different probabilities of occurrence   
• Failures can have different consequences   
• Simple components degrade, complex systems fail  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• Required functionality can be achieved at the lowest practical cost with 
the appropriate maintenance  
• Maintenance cannot increase original design reliability   
• Hidden functions necessitate special treatment   
• Unnecessary maintenance wastes resources  
• Continuous improvement is the hallmark of good maintenance programs 
(Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 2007, 19).   
The fundamental goals of RCM are to develop maintenance tasks that best 
maintain system functionality at an affordable cost. To accomplish this functionality, the 
NAVSEA RCM handbook says maintenance requirements should be evaluated via a 
series of questions, such as the following.  
• What functions does the system perform?   
• What functional failures might occur?   
• Which functional failures are most likely to occur?   
• Are the functional failures obvious to the operator?   
• Do safety, mission, and cost consequences of failure exist and what are 
they?   
• What is the relative risk of failure?   
• Can anything be done to prevent likely failures?   
• What is the cost of failure mitigation? (Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command 2007, 15)  
Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011, 440) explain RCM results in the most effective 
preventative maintenance tasks through the use of a “tailored” logic approach and 
decision tree methodology. Figure 5 depicts a simplified RCM decision logic. The 
objective of a system maintenance strategy is to align a preventative maintenance 




Figure 5.  Simplified RCM Decision Logic  
 
After Blanchard, Benjamin S., and Wolter J. Fabrycky. 2011. Systems Engineering and 
Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
C. MAINTENANCE POLICY FOR U.S. NAVY SHIPS 
Navy ship maintenance policies and actions are steeped in RCM. RCM is at the 
core of Navy surface ship maintenance and provides the technical and programmatic 
rigor for selecting the appropriate type of maintenance. In accordance with the RCM 
handbook, maintenance is comprised of three categories: corrective, preventative, and 
alterative. Corrective maintenance restores failed functions by accomplishing repair or 
replacement. Preventative maintenance minimizes the opportunity for functions to fail 
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through the use of tests, inspections, adjustments, replacements, and routine actions, such 
as lubrication. Alterative maintenance (also known as modernization) eliminates 
unsatisfactory conditions by removing the cause of failed functions through redesign 
(Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 2007, 35). Table 1 summarizes the primary 
characteristics of these basic categories of maintenance. 
Table 1.   Three Types of Maintenance  
 
From Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. 2007. Reliability-Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) Handbook. 1. Washington, DC: Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command. 
D. CONDITION-BASED MAINTENANCE 
Maintenance and operational readiness are inextricably linked. Likewise, ship 
maintenance programs strongly influence the total operating cost of a ship. The 2009 
NAVSEA instruction on RCM and CBM says “maintenance programs must balance safe 
material condition, readiness, environmental compliance, and cost throughout the ship’s 
life cycle” (Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 2009, 2). CBM compliments 
RCM as the CNO’s maintenance plan for ship, aircraft, and infrastructure. The CBM 
strategy applies throughout a system’s life cycle and provides guidance for optimizing 
maintenance program costs. The NAVSEA RCM and CBM instruction says, “CBM is 
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maintenance performed on objective evidence of need provided by RCM analysis and 
associated enabling processes and technology” (2–3).  
The CNO’s CBM policy outlines the use of inspection, embedded sensors, and 
other equipment monitoring devices to derive objective evidence for maintenance (Chief 
of Naval Operations 2007, 8).  
An effective system maintenance strategy must analyze the cost and practicality 
of method for determining the material condition of a system required for the appropriate 
selection of CBM. Wiring a system or equipment with sensor capabilities to monitor and 
forecast material condition may not be cost effective, sufficiently accurate, or 
comprehensive. Similarly, accomplishment of system inspection comes with its own 
challenges. A prerequisite for system inspection is the development of inspection 
procedures and specifications. Inspectors must be trained and qualified. Additionally, 
inspection may require an operating system to be taken offline and isolated for the safety 
of the inspector. These are just a sample of considerations for selecting the appropriate 
CBM approach.  
The CBM approach determines whether reactive or proactive maintenance will be 
performed. Reactive maintenance is performed for items designated fix-when-fail or 
those items that have unpredictable failure characteristics. The CNO’s CBM philosophy 
says a run-to-failure planned maintenance strategy is effective for items that have little 
readiness or safety impact (Chief of Naval Operations 2007, 8). The same policy says 
“proactive maintenance can be considered either preventative or predictive in nature and 
the maintenance performed can range from an inspection, test, or servicing to an overhaul 
or complete replacement” (8). Preventative maintenance is also referred to as scheduled 
maintenance. Scheduled maintenance can be time-based (calendar) or cycle-based 
(number or equipment starts/stops). In the event of premature failure, an item with an 
established schedule for planned maintenance can require reactive maintenance to repair. 
The CBM policy also describes the two subsets of predictive maintenance that fall under 
proactive maintenance. The two subsets are diagnostic or prognostic. Diagnostic is 
limited to identifying forthcoming functional failures while prognostics go a step further 
to enable forecasting of a system or equipment’s remaining service life (8–9). Proactive 
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maintenance, and more specifically, preventative maintenance, are most closely related to 
the focus of this thesis. 
E. FIVE TYPES OF PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE TASKS 
PM tasks are comprised of five different types: condition-directed, time-directed, 
failure finding, servicing, and lubrication. Table 2 provides a summary of these 
preventative maintenance tasks.  
Table 2.   Preventative Maintenance Tasks  
 
From Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. 2007. Reliability-Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) Handbook. 1. Washington, DC: Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command, 36. 
1. Condition-Directed 
As defined by the RCM handbook, “a Condition-Directed (CD) task is a periodic 
diagnostic test or inspection that compares the existing material condition or performance 
of an item with established standards and directs further action accordingly” 
(Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 2007, 37). The purpose of CD tasks is to 
prevent a functional failure from occurring by means of identifying and mitigating the 
 38 
potential failure. The logic behind this task type is illustrated in the hypothetical P-F (or 
potential failure—functional failure) curve from the RCM handbook and shown in Figure 
6. Figure 6 “depicts the relationship between resistance to failure and operating age for an 
item. Resistance to failure is measured from the point of initial introduction into service 
to the point of actual failure” (37). The CD inspection interval  is established to 
provide ample opportunity to detect functional failure before a functional failure can 
occur.  
Figure 6.  P-F Curve  
 
From Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. 2007. Reliability-Centered 







Determining an identifiable physical condition, or potential failure that indicates a 
functional failure is imminent, can be difficult. CD tasks are not possible without the 
necessary conditions to provide an alert to failure. Complicating matters further, identical 
items can fail at different ages in service, as shown by Figure 7. According to the RCM 
handbook, this variation in failures happens for several reasons, such as the following.  
• Manufacturing tolerances   
• Different lots or vendors   
• Different operating profiles and stresses (Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command 2007, 38). 
Figure 7.  Like Items Fail at Different Ages 
 
From Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. 2007. Reliability-Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) Handbook. 1. Washington, DC: Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command, 38. 
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2. Time-Directed Life-Renewal 
The RCM handbook explains “time-directed (TD) life-renewal tasks restore or 
replace an item regardless of its actual material condition before the item reaches an age 
at which the probability of failure becomes unacceptable” (Commander, Naval Sea 
Systems Command 2007, 39). The term wear out is used to describe an increase in the 
probability of failure. The same handbook says Navy maintenance policy deems TD tasks 
appropriate when evidence is available that most units of the population will end their 
service life at a specific age and no measureable condition exists to predict failure. An 
explicit description of what qualifies as evidence of population quantity required to be 
considered a majority is ambiguous. In any case, the handbook states that when an item 
reaches this point, two typical actions can be taken to renew useful life of the item.  
• Restoration (also known as overhaul or rebuild) 
• Replacement (Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 2007, 39) 
Applying a TD task type without sufficient objective evidence of need can lead to 
excessive maintenance and adversely impact the TOC of the system. This thesis posits a 
holistic review of a system maintenance strategy that leverages systems engineering 
methodology, will provide persuasive indications in favor of applying a TD task 
approach. A maintenance strategy review of this nature goes beyond evidence of 
population failure data. The need to meet OFRP schedule requirements, avoid long lead 
time material (LLTM) challenges, decrease maintenance planning and integration risk, 
and reduce contract change requests are examples of additional items to consider.  
3. Failure-Finding 
In accordance with the RCM handbook, failure-finding (FF) tasks are an 
important set of tasks “used to evaluate the condition of off-line or intermittent-use 
functions whose failures are typically hidden from the operating crew” (Commander, 
Naval Sea Systems Command 2007, 40). This task type is appropriate when no CD or TD 
task can be devised to prevent failure. FF tasks discover hidden failures that have already 
occurred. The handbook recommends periodic inspection for functional failures of both 
off-line and intermittent-use items to ensure they will operate when needed (40).  
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4. Servicing 
The RCM handbook states servicing (S) tasks replenish operating consumables, 
such as lubricating oil sumps required for normal operations (Commander, Naval Sea 
Systems Command 2007, 41). Servicing tasks can be either CD or TD.  
5. Lubrication 
NAVSEA says lubrication (L) tasks direct routine greasing and lubricating of 
mechanical friction surfaces. This task also includes the application of a grease or 
lubricant to stationary surfaces to provide protection from the environment (Commander, 
Naval Sea Systems Command 2007, 41). Lubrication tasks can be either CD or TD.  
F. BACKFIT RCM PROCESS 
A static maintenance program is not optimal. The classic RCM process is used to 
develop the right maintenance tasks for new systems, subsystems, and equipment during 
ship acquisition. This initial task development is based on very limited to no operational 
data. Consequently, the RCM process should not remain static and necessitates 
continuous improvement. The backfit RMC process is designed for maintenance program 
improvement. The RCM handbook explains the process technically reviews the current 
maintenance tasks for a system using historical operational data (Commander, Naval Sea 
Systems Command 2007, 74). Information collection is a critical aspect required to 
support backfit RCM. For this reason, it is imperative that a maintenance program 
adequately account for all historical maintenance records applicable to a system. The 
absence of operational maintenance data precludes the necessary objective evidence 
required to validate technically or improve a maintenance task.  
The backfit RCM methodology employs a decision tree with a series of evaluation 
steps for the topics of reliability degradation, task applicability, task effectiveness, and 
recommending change. Figures 8 through 10 are a three-part figure that outlines the six 
steps of the backfit RCM process.  
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Figure 8.  Backfit RCM Roadmap Part A 
 
After Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. 2007. Reliability-Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) Handbook. 1. Washington, DC: Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command, 75. 
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Figure 9.  Backfit RCM Roadmap Part B 
 
After Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. 2007. Reliability-Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) Handbook. 1. Washington, DC: Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command, 75. 
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Figure 10.  Backfit RCM Roadmap Part C  
 
After Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. 2007. Reliability-Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) Handbook. 1. Washington, DC: Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command., 75. 
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IV. CONCEPTS TO IMPROVE SURFACE SHIP MAINTENANCE 
A. MANAGING RISK IN A FIRM FIXED PRICE ENVIRONMENT 
A concerted effort to cultivate maximum maintenance efficiencies is necessary to 
achieve ship service life in an increasingly austere funding environment. Maintenance 
inefficiencies cannot be absorbed or disregarded. To this end, senior surface ship 
maintenance leaders are aggressively pursuing several maintenance paradigm shifts. An 
example of one of these paradigm shifts is the surface maintenance community’s 
transference from the MSMO cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracting strategy to a 
single-award (SA) indefinite-delivery-indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) firm-fixed-price (FFP) 
environment. According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR):  
a FFP contract provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on 
the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing the contract. 
This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk and full 
responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. A fixed price 
contract strategy provides maximum incentive for the contractor to control 
costs and perform effectively and imposes a minimum administrative 
burden upon the contracting parties. (General Services Administration, 
DOD, NASA 2005, 16.2–1) 
Simply put, a contractor is paid a fixed price to do a specific job described in the 
contract. In most cases, a FFP contract strategy is the preferred contract when the work or 
task is well defined.  
The government is subject to cost and schedule overruns in the event work is not 
well defined, or even worse, required and not defined at all. Poorly defined work 
specifications have a tendency to yield growth-work. All work after contract 
definitization is considered new or growth-work in accordance with the Joint Fleet 
Maintenance Manual (U.S. Fleet Forces Command 2013, II–II–2D–12). A consequence 
of required growth-work includes contract modifications necessary to re-scope the work 
package and ensure it properly reflects the maintenance requirement. To minimize 
schedule impacts of growth-work, the government may have the option to fund additional 
labor at a premium cost. A benefit of the SA IDIQ FFP contract strategy is the pre-
negotiated labor rate for growth-work. Nonetheless, excessive growth-work puts schedule 
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at risk. Eliminating growth-work is the only sure way to avoid the associated uncertainty 
and risk. 
To best mitigate the uncertainty and risk of growth-work and capitalize on the 
pre-negotiated pricing of work, a directed maintenance strategy should be evaluated. The 
concern with applying a directed maintenance strategy centers on executing excessive or 
unnecessary repairs. Conversely, underestimating the scope of work is a concern that 
ultimately could result in growth-work. However, according to Jonathan Mun (2010, 46) 
on the subject of modeling risk, risk can be captured quantitatively through step-by-step 
applications of Monte Carlo simulation. Furthermore, maintenance risk can be quantified 
and evaluated via equipment RBDs and FTA. RBD and FTA are classic reliability 
analysis tools that can provide incredible insight into equipment and system risk. 
B. PITFALLS OF OPEN AND INSPECT 
To minimize growth-work, the scope of work must be accurately defined in the 
repair work specification. It should also be noted that properly documented references 
and technically qualified repair procedures are important. Nonetheless, to reduce 
uncertainty and define a repair requirement in compliance with CBM policy, the typical 
maintenance strategy calls to open and inspect (O/I) the machinery, which is a PM 
approach that employs CD tasks type for inspection. The inspection results document the 
failed component(s) for repair. An open, inspect, and repair approach to ship maintenance 
raises several concerns. First, labor is the most expensive portion of virtually all ship 
maintenance. The man-hours spent on inspection do not directly translate to improved 
readiness. However, with an open and inspect methodology, the inspection man-hours are 
a necessary step in the repair process. Second, an inspection is highly dependent on the 
capability and capacity of the inspecting work force. Concerning the former, capability 
translates to quality of inspection. If an assessor fails to identify the component failure 
properly or understand the failure mode and mechanism, the repair recommendation will 
not be accurate. This scenario results in planning for the wrong scope of work and 
culminates in growth-work. Third, identifying and repairing or replacing the failed 
component does not mean the material condition or expected service life of the system or 
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equipment has been reset or rebaselined. Rather, depending on the component reliability 
of the system, the life-limiting component has merely shifted. In other words, the 
replacement of parts found out of tolerance following an I/O ignores the fact that other 
components still within tolerance have a finite service life and may now become the life-
limiting item. Fourth, an I/O or CD methodology does not allow for sufficient long lead-
time repair parts management or parts availability in the event immediate repairs are 
required. Finally, during availability execution, growth-work as a result of open and 
inspect requires the contract be modified before the repair can be executed. The 
combination of long lead-time parts, new schedule integration efforts, and request for 
contract change (RCC) cycle time can drive noncritical path work onto the critical path. 
Ultimately, if eliminating growth-work in totality is not possible, understanding the 
uncertainty and risk of surface ship maintenance is crucial. Traditional RCM analysis 
does not sufficiently account for all aspects of CD inspection task execution in a 
maintenance environment governed by specific processes and schedule constraints. 
Systems engineering applies a more holistic approach to help avoid the pitfalls of open 
and inspect methods in practice today. 
C. APPLYING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPLICATIONS TO SYSTEM 
MAINTENANCE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT 
This thesis introduces and demonstrates the application of systems engineering 
tools and concepts beneficial to system maintenance strategy development. Reference to 
the NSTCP is used to aid in familiarizing the reader with the systems engineering 
applications described in this chapter. 
1. Understanding Risk and Uncertainty 
Cost, schedule, and performance risks are important concepts to consider when 
developing a system maintenance strategy. The Risk Management Guide for DOD 
Acquisition defines risk as a “measure of future uncertainties in achieving program 
performance goals and objectives within defined cost, schedule and performance 
constraints” (Department of Defense 2006, 1). This guide goes on to list three 
components of risk.  
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• “A future root cause (yet to happen), which, if eliminated or 
corrected, would prevent a potential consequence from occurring” 
• “A probability (or likelihood) assessed at the present time of that 
future root cause occurring” 
• “The consequence (or effect) of that future occurrence” (1). 
To manage, risk five fundamental questions must be understood; 
• What can go wrong? 
• What is the probability (likelihood) the event will happen? 
• What are the consequences? 
• What can be done to prevent or mitigate the event within the schedule? 
• Can we afford it? 
Maintaining warships ready for tasking to support operational schedule 
requirements depends heavily on ship maintenance availabilities meeting cost, technical, 
and schedule timeline requisites. Surface ship maintenance is an incredibly complex 
business. Numerous causes and effects, some of which are interrelated, drive surface ship 
maintenance availability budget and schedule risk. Brassard and Ritter (1994, 23) 
describe “a Fishbone diagram is a useful tool to identify, explore, and graphically display, 
in increasing detail, all of the likely causes related to a problem or condition to discover 
its root cause(s).”  A Fishbone diagram illustrating the causes and effects for surface ship 
maintenance availabilities not finishing on budget and schedule (see Figure 11) also 
indicates areas of uncertainty that warrant further evaluation. The fishbone diagram in 
Figure 11 is a dispersion analysis type. This type of fishbone diagram is constructed by 
placing individual causes within each “major” cause category to explain the effect in 
question. Individual causes point to the “major” cause category arrow. For example, a 
major cause for the effect “availability cost and schedule increase” is “planning,” 
numerically designated 4.0. “Inaccurate work specifications” numerically designated 4.3 
is an individual cause under the major cause category “planning.” Vertical arrows 
pointing to individual causes are in themselves identified causes for the individual cause. 
For example, “insufficient workforce” numerically designated 5.1.1 is a cause for “poor 
contractor performance” labeled 5.1. 
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Figure 11.  Surface Ship Maintenance Availability Fishbone Diagram 
 
 
Risk for each of the areas identified in the fishbone diagram can be subjectively 
reported using a risk matrix (see Figure 12). The level of likelihood of each cause is 
established utilizing specified criteria (see Table 3). “For example, if the cause has an 
estimated 50 percent probability of occurring, the corresponding likelihood is average” 
(Department of Defense 2006, 12). For the fishbone diagram in Figure 11, cause 1.1, 
“insufficient funds and budget uncertainty” is estimated to occur approximately 50 
percent of the time. “The level and types of consequences of each risk are established 
utilizing criteria, such as those described in Table 4” (Department of Defense 2006, 12). 
A single consequence scale is not appropriate for all programs. For this reason, the user 
can tailor the levels and types of consequences in Table 4 to suit a specific project or 
availability. Continuing with the example insufficient funds and budget uncertainty, “this 
same cause has no impact on performance or cost, but may result in a minor schedule slip 
that will not impact a key milestone. The corresponding consequence is average for this 
risk” (Department of Defense 2006, 12). Analyzing risk of an existing maintenance 
strategy is a necessary first step towards improving the strategy.  
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Table 3.   Levels of Likelihood Criteria  
  
After Department of Defense. 2006. Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense.  
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Table 4.   Levels and Types of Consequences Criteria  
 
After Department of Defense. 2006. Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
2. Navy Standard Titanium Centrifugal Pump Description 
The NSTCP is a critical piece of equipment in the firemain system. The NSTCP is 
used to develop the required seawater pressure for the ship’s firefighting system (see 
Figures 13 and 14). The website for Navy maritime damage control information sharing 
states the “shipboard firemain system consists of fire pumps, piping consisting of vertical 
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pump risers, longitudinal service mains, cross-connects, service risers, branch lines, and 
valves through which seawater is pumped to fire hose stations, aqueous film forming 
foam (AFFF) stations and sprinkler systems” (Maritime DC & PPE Information Center 
2015). This same website explains the NSTCP also “supplies water to flushing, 
emergency drainage, backup seawater service, machinery and electronic cooling systems. 
The Countermeasure Wash down System (CMWD), magazine sprinkler, weapons 
elevators, missile water deluge system, trash burner, flight deck weapons staging area and 
compartment sprinkling systems are also supplied by the firemain” (Maritime DC & PPE 
Information Center 2015). The fire pump is a common piece of equipment across all 
ships classes in the Navy. For this reason, the fire pump is considered an appropriate item 
to assist with demonstrating various system engineering tools and concepts.  
Figure 13.  Navy Standard Titanium Centrifugal Pump 1000 GPM 
 
From Naval Sea Systems Command. 2012. Navy Standard Titanium Centrifugal Pump 




Figure 14.  Navy Standard Titanium Fire Pump 
 
From Buffalo Pumps. “Navy/Marine.” 2015. http://www.buffalopumps.com/markets-
applications/navy-marine/. 
3. Context Diagrams 
The NSTFP is a system within the firemain system. The firemain system 
comprises various dispersed, independent systems that interact together to form a 
complex and integrated aggregate. A context diagram is a useful tool for illustrating 
system boundaries and is an element of functional modeling. Dr. Stuart Burge (2011, 1) 
explains that context diagrams provide a basic model depicting system boundaries and its 
interactions with its environment. He summarizes “a context diagram is a single picture 
that has the system of interest at the center, with no details of its interior structure or 
function, surrounded by those elements in its environment with which it interacts” (1). 
For the purposes of this thesis, a context diagram of the firemain system helps emphasize 
the system of systems construct and the interactions of the NSTCP within the system (see 
Figure 15). Understanding system boundaries and its interactions with critical elements in 
its environment are important to developing the maintenance strategy for a system. 
Ignoring system boundaries or environmental interactions may result in insufficient or 
incorrect maintenance and waste resources. Understanding a system’s boundaries and 
interactions is part of recognizing how the system operates.  
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Figure 15.  Firemain System Context Diagram 
 
 
4. Flow Diagrams and Functional Decomposition 
A flow diagram is commonly used to provide a graphical representation that 
shows the “flow” of data or information exchange through a system. For the purposes of 
this thesis, a diagrammatic system flow of seawater through the firemain system further 
illustrates the functions of the NSTCP. The system flow diagram depicts the upstream 
and downstream interactions with seawater experienced by the various components and 
systems, including the NSTCP (see Figure 16). To understand objects and their 
interactions as they relate to integration more deeply, a functional model the NSTCP can 
be created with the objective of recognizing the natural relations between function and 
objects. The functional model originates from decomposing the concept of a function 
from the highest level, for example, to “provide firemain pressure.” The functional 
decomposition of the NSTCP helps illustrate the basic reasoning for the pump, move 
seawater (see Figure 17). System flow diagrams and functional decomposition provide 
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important context necessary to understand how a system works. This information is 
beneficial for maintenance strategy analysis.  




Figure 17.  NSTCP Functional Decomposition 
 
 
5. Reliability Block Diagram 
A RBD is a graphical approach for illustrating how component reliability 
influences the success or failure of a system. Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011, 377) add 
RBDs to provide a basis of information necessary for the accomplishment of reliability 
prediction, maintenance, and other reliability analysis tools, such as failure mode effect 
criticality analysis (FMECA), and FTA. FMECA and FTA are described later in this 
chapter. RBDs depict system configuration and account for redundancy and single points 
of failures. RBDs help enable the documentation and analysis of common cause failures 
indicating vulnerable system components. This information is instrumental in developing 
a system maintenance strategy or designing improvements to a system.  
Redundancy-single point failure relationships are an important aspect of RBDs. 
Redundancy is diagrammed as components in parallel where all must fail for the system 
to fail. Reliability of a parallel system is calculated as follows where R is the reliability of 
a system, i is a component, n is the number of components, and  is the reliability of 
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iR
 Single point failures are diagrammed as components in series where any failure 
will cause the system to fail. Reliability of a series system is calculated as follows where 
R is the reliability of a system, i is a component, n is the number of components, and 






R R R R
=
= =∏ . 
The NSTCP is a system of physical components entirely designed in series (see 
Figure 18). For this reason, the firemain system is designed with multiple NSTCPs to 
increase system reliability. In the absence of component reliability data provided with the 
original equipment provisioning technical documentation (PTD), component failure data 
analysis over time can be used to calculate component and system reliability. The 
approach of collecting data over time provides the ability to determine probability of 
failure occurrence. To help with determining probability of occurrence, simulations can 
be run. For example, according to Jonathan Mun (2010, 45), Monte Carlo is a simulation 
that “can be run on a model with multiple interacting input assumptions and the output of 
interest can be captured as a simulation forecast and the relevant probabilities can be 
obtained, such as the probability of failure.” This type of probability data can be 
considered the first step in narrowing the repair scope for a piece of equipment. 
Regarding the NSTCP as an example, if the foundation has a reliability of 0.99 while the 
mechanical seal has a reliability of 0.80, the logical conclusion is to focus on the 
mechanical seal. This probability data is also useful in developing standard assessment 
procedures, as well as possible modernization considerations. The importance of data 
cannot be overemphasized. Without sufficient data, a determination of proper repair 
scope via RCM analysis is not possible. A lack of reliability data drives a need for CD 
inspection tasks to determine repair scope in compliance with Navy CBM policy. 
Concerning NSTCP, a CD approach of this nature fails to capitalize on years of 
operational data. The maintenance community must recognize the value of collecting 




Figure 18.  Navy Standard Titanium Centrifugal Pump (NSTCP) Reliability 
Block Diagram (RBD) 
 
 
A reliability block diagram of physical components alone is not sufficient enough 
data to hedge the risk of growth-work and shift to a directive maintenance strategy. The 
probability that fixing the most unreliable component of a system each time the system 
fails does not account for a series of other variables that must be considered. To 
understand further details of how a system fails, FMECA and system FTA are reviewed. 
6. Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
The FMECA is a structured methodology for uncovering and analyzing latent 
system deficiencies. From Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011, 385), FMECA includes a step-
by-step analysis of potential causes for system failure. The analysis focuses on 
determining the magnitude of a failure on system performance and safety. Blanchard and 
Fabrycky (2011) go on to explain FMECA is a 12-step process (see Figure 19) that 
begins with defining system requirements. System requirements are generally known for 
in-service systems, such as the NSTCP. The second step is to define the system in 
functional terms. The third step is a top-down breakout of the system-level requirement 
referred to as requirements allocation. The fourth step is to identify failure modes. A 
“failure mode” is the way in which a component is prevented from accomplishing its 
function (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 388). The failure mode is closely related to the 
failure mechanism. The terminology used to describe a failure mode is important to 
understanding the failure mechanism. According to Daly (2013, 6), a failure mechanism 
is the means by which a failure mode develops. Daly (17) summarizes systems with 







• Overload  
Recognition of the failure mode and failure mechanism is relevant in the 
development of a preventative maintenance strategy. A FTA is an effective approach to 
identify failure modes. The fifth and sixth steps of a FMECA include determining the 
failure mechanisms or causes of failure and the effects. Step seven is the identification of 
failure detection means. Step eight is the rating of failure mode severity, which is 
analogous to levels and types of consequences from Table 4. Similarly, step nine is the 
rating of failure mode frequency and is similar to the levels of likelihood criteria from 
Table 3. The tenth step calls to rate the failure mode detection probability identified in 
step seven. For purposes of quantification, a scale similar to that for steps eight and nine 
can be used. Step eleven is the analysis of failure mode criticality. According to 
Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011, 390), generating a risk priority number (RPN) is a 
valuable way to measure severity, frequency, and probability of detection objectively as a 
single value. The RPN reflects failure mode criticality and is calculated with the 
following equation: 
RPN = (severity rating) (frequency rating) (probability of detection rating). 
Assigning numerical values to severity (consequence), frequency (likelihood), and 
probability of detection are necessary to calculate a RPN. The probability of detection 
value is inverse to the actual probability of detection. Specifically, a high probability of 
detection will have a low numerical value when used to calculate the associated RPN. 
The final FMECA step is to initiate recommendations for improvement (Blanchard and 
Fabrycky 2011, 390). 
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Figure 19.  Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Process 
 
After Blanchard, Benjamin S., and Wolter J. Fabrycky. 2011. Systems Engineering and 
Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 387. 
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7. Fault Tree Analysis Benefits to Maintenance Strategy Development 
System FTA can positively influence a maintenance strategy. FTA is described as 
“a systematic, top down, deductive approach involving the graphical enumeration and 
analysis of different ways in which a particular failure can occur and the probability of its 
occurrence” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 390). FTA uses Boolean logic to combine a 
series of lower-level failure events. The exercise of developing a FTA is an insightful 
method for recognizing potential failure modes. A FTA enables a technician to 
understand the interrelationship of components and more accurately plan a repair. A basic 
example FTA for the NSTCP (see Figure 20) illustrates the underlying failure modes of a 
mechanical seal. Specifically, after opening and inspecting a failed NSTCP, suppose a 
technician identifies the mechanical seal as the failed component. The technician will 
logically repair the mechanical seal accordingly. However, if the mechanical seal failed 
because of excessive axial movement or imbalance in the total indicated run-out (TIR) of 
the shaft sleeve, the mechanical seal will repetitively fail prematurely until the root cause 
is addressed. For this reason, fault trees are an effective tool for recognizing potential 
underlying failure modes. As a tool to improve the way ship maintenance is planned, in 
combination with reliability data, a FTA can emphasize where to focus inspection efforts 
and help avoid overlooking underlying root causes.  
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8. Level of Repair Analysis Considerations 
Level of repair analysis (LORA) is the process of determining whether the 
components of a system should be designated for replacement or repair. In the case of 
repair, the process includes determining the appropriate maintenance level. Basten, 
Schuttne, and Van Der Heijden (2009, 120) state determination to repair a system or 
subsystem at a specific maintenance level begins with identifying both variable and fixed 
costs. The article describes variable costs to include labor hours, spare parts usage, and 
transportation costs. The same article lists fixed costs as costs for warehousing of spare 
parts and costs for test equipment. It is important to point out that LORA does not 
consider how long a repair will take and associated impacts on maintenance schedule. 
Additionally, part criticality is not reflected. According to the Basten, Schutten, and Van 
Der Heijden article and other works on LORA, “the objective of LORA is to minimize 
the total (variable and fixed) costs” (121).  
LORA for Navy supply parts is documented on the system’s allowance parts list 
(APL) under the source maintenance and recoverability (SM&R) code. An APL is an 
allowance document produced for installed equipment. More specifically, an APL is a list 
of all maintenance significant parts, special tools, and consumables necessary to maintain 
the applicable item in operating condition. The SM&R code reflects the LORA and 
provides the maintainer guidance as to the appropriate maintenance level (organic, 
intermediate, supplier/depot) for repair items. The SM&R code for the centrifugal pump 
indicates it can be removed and replaced by ship’s force but must be sent to the depot for 
complete repair.  
The SM&R code does not take part criticality into account, only cost and quality. 
Quality is accounted for by way of ensuring the lowest level maintenance organization 
identified is technically capable of repairing the item. Corrective maintenance cycle time 
is not a factor of LORA. Consequently, the lack of focus on the schedule parameter of 
ship maintenance creates risk to the availability and OFRP. Material cannibalization is 
the fleet’s only recourse in the event a spare part needed for repair is not available when 
required. Material cannibalization carries with it its own risk and can create a ripple 
effect of material readiness challenges in the fleet if not closely monitored. A system 
 65 
maintenance strategy must account for schedule where reliability analysis techniques and 
LORA do not. The cost to readiness must be considered when evaluating systems that 
present schedule risk due to unacceptable maintenance downtime (MDT).  
D. MAIN GAS TURBINE EXHAUST SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND 
MAINTENANCE STRATEGY  
1. Main Gas Turbine Exhaust System Description 
The Navy maintenance community refers to the Ticonderoga Cruiser propulsion 
system as a complex system of systems designed to provide high performance mobility 
through the water. While a system of systems is comprised of independent systems that 
can function completely on their own (U.S. Navy System of Systems Engineering Guide, 
2006), this thesis reflects the maintenance community verbiage. The main gas turbine 
exhaust system is a critical piece of the overall propulsion system. The propulsion system 
includes four marine type gas turbine engines (GTE) to deliver shaft horsepower to each 
of the port and starboard shafts. Each gas turbine engine is enclosed inside a gas turbine 
module (GTM). According to the cruiser propulsion plant manual (PPM), “the module 
enclosures serve to provide an engine-mounting platform, thermal and acoustical 
insulation, inlet and exhaust ducting, fire extinguishing capability, and a controlled 
environment for the gas turbine” (See Figure 21) (Naval Sea Systems Command 2002, 
49). The same PPM says an interface is created between the module enclosure and uptake 
duct provided by the flexible couplings (104). The ship information book (SIB) for CG-
52 states, “flexible joints act as airflow path connections between cooling ducts and 
cooling fans and between the gas turbine exhaust duct anchor supports. In addition, the 
flexible joints absorb thermal growth (created by operation of the gas turbine engines), 
shock excursions, pressure forces, and deflection caused by ship motion. Lastly, the 
flexible joints attenuate transmission of vibration from the GTM enclosure to the ducts 
and ship” (see Figure 22) (Naval Sea Systems Command 2009, 261). The SIB also 
outlines “additional major parts of the propulsion and auxiliary systems include the main 
reduction gears, shafting and bearings, fuel oil service, intake air, lube oil service, reverse 
osmosis (RO) desalination system, high pressure air, seawater, AEGIS seawater pumps, 
freshwater, low pressure air, combat dry air, and bleed air” (39).  
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Figure 21.  Marine Gas Turbine Module 
 
From Surface Warfare Officer School. 2000. LM2500 Material Readiness. PowerPoint. 
Newport, RI: Surface Warfare Officer School, 49. 
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Figure 22.  Enclosure Inlet and Exhaust Components 
 
From Surface Warfare Officer School. 2000. LM2500 Material Readiness. PowerPoint. 
Newport, RI: Surface Warfare Officer School, 200. 
The marine gas turbine comprises the compressor, combustor, and turbine (See 
Figure 23). The cruiser PPM provides a technical description of the primary airflow 
across the turbine and says:  
it begins with a draw of air from the intake duct via the gas generator and 
proceeds through the enclosure inlet, plenum, inlet screen, bellmouth, and 
front frame. Following compression of the air, it enters the combustion 
section where some of the air is mixed with fuel, and the mixture is 
burned. The residual air is used to center the flame in the combustor and 
for cooling the combustor, the high-pressure turbine rotor and blades, and 
the first-stage high-pressure turbine nozzle. Hot gas from the combustor 
passes through the high-pressure turbine where some of the energy is 
extracted by the high-pressure turbine rotor and used to turn the 
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compressor. The hot gas exits the high pressure turbine, passes through the 
turbine mid frame, and enters the power turbine where the majority of the 
remaining energy is extracted by the power turbine rotor and drives the 
high speed flexible coupling shaft. The shaft provides the power to the 
reduction gear high-speed pinion. Finally, the remaining gas leaves the 
power turbine, passes through the turbine rear frame into the exhaust duct, 
and out to the atmosphere via the uptake duct. (Naval Sea Systems 
Command 2009a, 139) 
The exhaust ducts are part of the exhaust system and designed to prevent gas 
turbine exhaust air from re-entering the ship. The final piece of the main propulsion gas 
turbine system is the exhaust system. 
Figure 23.  Main Gas Turbine Engine (LM2500)  
 
From Surface Warfare Officer School. 2000. LM2500 Material Readiness. PowerPoint. 
Newport, RI: Surface Warfare Officer School, 111. 
Analysis and recommendations for improvement of the main gas turbine exhaust 
system maintenance strategy are the focus of this thesis. Five major parts comprise the 
exhaust system: the exhaust duct, the inner deflector, the outer cone, the exhaust 
extension, and the primary outlet flexible joint also known as the exhaust air flexible joint 
(See Figure 24), according to the cruiser SIB (Naval Sea Systems Command 2009a, 198). 
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These five parts direct the gas turbine exhaust from the exhaust end of the power turbine 
to the ship exhaust duct. The inner deflector helps to redirect exhaust air up into the 
uptake ducting. The outer cone aids in providing protection to the high-speed flexible 
coupling shaft. Thermal insulation around the exterior of the exhaust duct helps reduces 
heat transfer to the enclosure (198). The outer cone, inner deflector, and turbine rear 
frame all reside within the structure of the exhaust duct and form the exhaust duct 
assembly. The exhaust duct structure is commonly referred to as the exhaust collector 
(See Figures 24 and 26). The stainless steel structure of the exhaust collector is exposed 
to extreme cyclic thermal loading. Technical information from the SIB says the exhaust 
system can withstand a maximum gas flow of 160 lb/sec at 897.5 degrees Fahrenheit 
exhaust temperature (271). The exhaust collector is held in place within the module 
enclosure by four support legs attached to support lugs welded to a C-channel stiffener 
bar running along the left and right side of the exhaust collector. The C-channel stiffener 
acts as a structural strength member for the exhaust collector. Vent holes located along 
the interface between the exhaust collector wall and C-channel prevent pockets of hot air 
from building. Similar drain holes are located at the bottom forward and aft section of the 
exhaust collector to prevent an explosion from accumulated fuel. The C-channel weld 
and vent and drain holes are exposed to significant thermal loads and prone to cracking 
(See Figure 25). Gusset plates are welded at the top of the exhaust collector corners to 
connect the exhaust collector (See Figures 26 and 27). Gusset plates are also prone to 
cracking (See Figure 28).  
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Figure 24.  Exhaust Duct Assembly  
 
From Surface Warfare Officer School. 2000. LM2500 Material Readiness. PowerPoint. 
Newport, RI: Surface Warfare Officer School, 7. 
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Figure 25.  Exhaust Collector Vent Hole Cracks 
 
 
Figure 26.  Exhaust Collector Vent Hole Cracks 
 
After Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. 2014. LM2500 Propulsion Gas 
Turbine Module: Technical Manual, Organizational Level Maintenance. Vol. 2. 




Figure 27.  Exhaust Collector Gusset Plate Details 
 
After Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. 2014. LM2500 Propulsion Gas 
Turbine Module: Technical Manual, Organizational Level Maintenance. Vol. 2. 
Washington, DC: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, 1205. 
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Figure 28.  Gusset Cracks 
 
 
The exhaust air flexible joint connects to the uptake duct. This subtle yet distinct 
connection has the effect of blurring system boundaries because exhaust air passes 
seamlessly through the systems and they both serve the same ultimate function, to expel 
exhaust air. Assessments and repairs of the gas turbine exhaust system and uptake system 
are often accomplished without bias towards this system boundary. Nonetheless, 
understanding the system design and boundaries is important to RCM analysis and 
establishing the correct system maintenance strategy boundaries.  
2. Main Gas Turbine Uptake System 
The uptake system of the Ticonderoga Cruiser serves to route the exhaust air 
safely from the gas turbine exhaust system up through the ship and out to the atmosphere. 
The uptake system extends from the exhaust duct flexible joint located in the main engine 
room below the main deck up through the 05 level via the exhaust stacks (See Figure 29). 
The uptake traverses through the 01, 02, 03, and 04 levels until it reaches the mixing 
room. The mixing room on the 04-level has louvers on the bulkhead to bring in ambient 
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air to help cool the exhaust air before it leaves the stack (See Figure 30). The coalescing 
of ambient air with exhaust air is important to reducing the ship’s heat signature.  
Figure 29.  Aft Main Engine (GTM 1A/1B) Uptake Diagram 
 
After Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. 2013. MRC: 23 8SWH N, Exhaust 
Duct 2591. Washington, DC: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. 
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Figure 30.  Exterior Photo of Mixing Room and Louvers 
 
 
3. Marine Gas Turbine Exhaust System Maintenance 
Maintenance associated with the marine gas turbine exhaust system on the CG-47 
Class ships is a combination of organizational, intermediate, and depot-level maintenance 
actions. Routine planned maintenance actions accomplished by the ship’s force 
encompass the majority of the maintenance performed. The planned maintenance for the 
CG-47 class marine gas turbine exhaust system is documented on maintenance index 
pages (MIPs) 2340/002 and 2591/002. These MIPs comprise the applicable maintenance 
requirement cards (MRCs) for the main propulsion gas turbine LM2500 and exhaust. A 
MRC provides the written maintenance requirement description, safety precautions, 
procedure for accomplishing the maintenance, and lists of the required instruments, 
supplies, and test equipment. The scope of these MRCs consists of inspections for cracks, 
erosion, corrosion, and deterioration requiring maintenance. MIPs and MRCs are 
accessible online at the Naval Logistics Technical Data (NAVLOGTD) Repository. 
Mixing Room 
Louvers Exhaust Stacks 
 76 
Intermediate-level maintenance for the gas turbine exhaust system is 
accomplished in accordance with the JFMM Volume IV, Chapter 23, and General Gas 
Turbine Bulletin (GGTB) 11, Marine Gas Turbine Inspectors (MGTIs). MGTIs are 
trained and certified to perform pre-planned major maintenance availability (PPMMA) 
inspections, pre-deployment assessments (PDAs), and gas turbine bulletin (GTB) 
inspections. These inspections provide a comprehensive material review of the entire 
marine gas turbine system. MGTI facilitated inspections are in accordance with technical 
guidance derived from technical manuals, planned maintenance system (PMS), and 
GTBs. MGTI inspection results provide the foundation of gas turbine system repairs for a 
follow-on maintenance availability to be accomplished by depot-level maintenance 
activities.  
Depot-level maintenance actions associated with the marine gas turbine exhaust 
system are largely corrective in nature. Repairs are identified and documented as a result 
of organizational and intermediate-level inspections. Private shipyard activities perform 
the majority of cruiser exhaust system repairs due to the complexity of structural repair 
and technical skills required. Repairs range from complete overhaul and restoration of the 
system to as-built conditions, to less extensive temporary repairs requiring technically 
authorized deviation from design specifications. Repairs are accomplished in accordance 
with technical guidance outlined in system technical manuals and GTBs. Local technical 
authority (LTA) from the RMC, shipbuilding specialists (SBSs) and requisite ship force 
representatives are involved with ensuring quality assurance and certifying the work is 
performed correctly.  
4. Current Main Gas Turbine Exhaust System Maintenance Strategy 
The main gas turbine exhaust system maintenance strategy consists entirely of FF 
PM tasks. The majority of the FF tasks are listed on the MIPs. The CMP includes one 
additional FF task by way of a scheduled material condition assessment designated 
G1E8. All the failure-finding tasks consist of periodic inspection for material 
discrepancies, such as cracks, corrosion, erosion, plugged drain holes, flammable liquids, 
and insulation deterioration while the system is off-line. Exhaust system inspections are 
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scheduled to coincide with the total ship readiness assessments (TSRAs) prior to the next 
scheduled CNO availability in accordance with the joint TYCOM TSRA instruction 
(Commander, Naval Surfaces Force, U.S. Pacific; Commander, Naval Surface Force, 
Atlantic; Commander, Naval Regional Maintenance Center 2012, 11). The exhaust 
system design precludes most functional failures from being observed during system 
operation. In accordance with the Navy’s CBM policy, corrective maintenance actions 
are planned following a FF inspection.  
The severity of material discrepancies found during inspection and ship’s 
operational schedule dictate the urgency of repair. Most repairs are planned for the 
follow-on CNO availability based on inspection results four to six months prior. Repairs 
are planned by the MSR under the MSMO CPAF contract. To ensure the necessary 
repairs are executed during the maintenance availability, the work specification written 
by the contractor and reviewed by the government begins with an inspection of the 
system. Following the inspection, a condition found report (CFR) is generated by the 
contractor and provided to the government maintenance team. The CFR lists all the 
discrepancies found during the inspection. The SBS verifies the contractor’s inspection 
findings. The maintenance team then generates a RCC to modify the original work item 
to include the necessary exhaust system repairs. To mitigate potential schedule impacts 
from growth work of this nature, FF inspections are required to be complete within the 
first 20 percent of the maintenance availability in accordance with the Joint Fleet 
Maintenance Manual (JFMM) (U.S. Fleet Forces Command 2013, II-I–3-29). These 
inspections are rarely all complete within the initial 20 percent of an availability for 
various reasons including schedule integration challenges, RMC capacity, and poor 
planning. 
5. Main Gas Turbine Exhaust System Growth-Work 
Growth-work associated with the main gas turbine exhaust system is a significant 
challenge for the maintenance community. The exhaust system is consistently ranked in 
the top most 40 ship work list item numbers (SWLINs) for growth-work. More than 80 
propulsion related SWLINs and an excess of a thousand possible growth-work SWLINs 
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total exist. SWLINs 259 and 234 include main gas turbine exhaust system growth work. 
CNRMC is the maintenance organization that tracks and develops availability growth-
work metrics. Figures 31 through 34 graphically indicate the magnitude of growth-work 
associated with the exhaust system. Growth-work involving the exhaust system can 
negatively impact availability schedule and is a risk to OFRP.  
Figure 31.  Growth-Work for 200 Level SWLINs 
 
After Commander, Naval Regional Maintenance Center. 2014. Historical Top Growth by 





Figure 32.  Top Global Growth for CG Class by SWLIN 
 
After Commander, Naval Regional Maintenance Center. 2014. Historical Top Growth by 




Figure 33.  Global Growth Work by SWLIN for EDSRA Type Availabilities 
 
After Commander, Naval Regional Maintenance Center. 2014. Historical Top Growth by 





Figure 34.  Global Growth-Work by SWLIN for ESRA Type Availabilities 
 
After Commander, Naval Regional Maintenance Center. 2014. Historical Top Growth by 
SWILN. Commander, Naval Regional Maintenance Center, 25. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE MAIN GAS TURBINE 
EXHAUST SYSTEM MAINTENANCE STRATEGY 
Navy leadership has made it clear that ships must complete availabilities on time 
in support of OFRP. OFRP is an important construct to future naval force employability, 
sailor quality of life, and the stability of the private ship industrial base. The sanctity of 
schedule is paramount, and careful management of availability schedule risk is necessary. 
Efforts to mitigate growth-work due to open and inspect associated failure-finding tasks 
are a means to mitigate availability schedule risk. Historical maintenance data is the key 
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to provide the objective quality evidence (OQE) needed to technically justify a shift from 
an entirely FF task approach to a schedule risk accommodating TD PM strategy, in 
harmony with the Navy’s CBM policy.  
1. Historical Data and Fault Tree Analysis  
Analogous to the NSTCP FTA, a FTA of the main gas turbine exhaust system is 
beneficial to understanding the potential failure modes of the system. The fault tree also 
provides a graphical breakdown of the entire exhaust system of systems. A breakdown of 
the system helps to analyze historical system maintenance data by logically classifying 
and binning the data by failure mode. Analysis of historical repair data helps determine 
whether a technically acceptable TD maintenance task can and should be developed. The 
variance of historical repair data across the class provides indication of risk to over or 
under executing maintenance. This thesis provides a FTA of the main gas turbine exhaust 
system and a summary historical data analysis of the gas turbine exhaust components 
(See Figures 35 through 42). The gas turbine exhaust components include the exhaust 
collector, exhaust extension, and primary exhaust flexible joint. Unfortunately, only a 
scant amount of detailed historical failure data on the gas turbine exhaust components is 
obtainable. A limited random sampling of historical MGTI inspection reports and RCCs 
form various Cruiser CNO availabilities was analyzed. MGTI inspection reports are 
maintained online at the Propulsion Executive Steering Committee (PESC) portal. The 
analysis indicates that an average of 41 linear inches of gas turbine exhaust component 
crack repairs per engine is required to be accomplished during a CNO availability (See 
Table 5).  
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Table 5.   Main Gas Turbine Exhaust Collector Failure Data 
 
 
2. A Hybrid Approach to Preventative Maintenance 
Generating a class standard work template (CSWT) that reflects the crack repair 
requirement in the original description of scope for a work item allows for efficiencies 
and reduces schedule risk. Acknowledging the crack repair requirement during the 
planning phase of the availability allows the repair activity to order material in advance, 
manage workforce requirements, and properly integrate the work into the master 
schedule. Repairs called out in the original work package are not considered growth-work 
and do not require a RCC to be accomplished. Conversely, identifying the need for crack 
repairs during the availability creates growth-work that puts both cost and schedule at 
risk. Concern of over or under executing maintenance after applying the TD task 
approach for this system to the entire Cruiser ship class can be easily monitored. A hybrid 
preventative maintenance approach that combines the necessity of a FF task with the 
practicality of a TD task creates the sensibility of a blended inspection task with a 
planned and budgeted repair task. Accomplishing the FF element of the hybrid 
preventative maintenance task provides the necessary data for future analysis and 
amendment. Adjusting the TD task to be made more or less conservative according to 
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historical inspection data analysis is a simple modification. Furthermore, the need for 
initial inspection of systems with inherent hidden failures, such as the exhaust system, is 
necessary to determine properly precisely where repairs are required. The 
recommendation for a hybrid preventative maintenance task is the logical improvement 
for the main gas turbine exhaust system maintenance strategy.  
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V. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE 
EXPLORATIONS 
A. MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
To achieve Navy surface ship force structure goals, it is imperative that ships in 
service today are effectively maintained. Sequestration imposes significant budget 
challenges that require efficiencies to be realized. Further, OFRP presents even greater 
maintenance availability schedule challenges. Executing “the right maintenance at the 
right time for the right price” within the schedule limitations is the epitome of efficient 
and effective ship repair (U.S. Fleet Forces Command 2013, II-II–2-7). Achieving such 
efficiencies requires a new structured approach to controlling growth-work and its 
impacts on maintenance availability cost and schedule. Improving something as complex 
as ship repair must be done one system at a time. A comprehensive analysis that looks 
across all aspects of ship maintenance is needed to avoid insulated recommendations that 
fail to account for all factors. Systems engineering makes tools and concepts available to 
recognize and quantify risk to plan more effectively for ship maintenance. This thesis 
reviewed programs, processes, policies, and procedures applicable to Navy maintenance 
strategy development and analysis. This thesis also analyzed the maintenance strategy for 
the main gas turbine exhaust system and explained a series of system engineering 
applications. The existing main gas turbine exhaust system maintenance strategy is found 
to inadequately account for critical schedule factors important to senior Navy leadership. 
Risk to maintenance availability cost and schedule linked to the preventative maintenance 
approach in place for the main gas turbine exhaust system was identified. Finally, this 
thesis identified a hybrid inspection and modifiable repair maintenance strategy with 
historical data underpinnings. This hybrid approach to the main gas turbine exhaust 
system maintenance strategy creates an opportunity to mitigate the extensive amount of 
growth-work currently associated with exhaust system maintenance. The hybrid 
preventative maintenance task approach to exhaust system maintenance is the product of 
a systems engineering focused maintenance strategy analysis. The system maintenance 
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strategy analysis through a systems-lens most effectively accounts for cost, schedule, and 
performance parameters.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Navy should develop and implement a CSWT that reflects the hybrid 
maintenance strategy recommended by this thesis for the main gas turbine exhaust 
collector. The system maintenance strategy should be reviewed for effectiveness after one 
year. The Navy should gather additional failure data to continue developing a hybrid 
maintenance strategy for the remaining exhaust system. The Navy should also consider 
efforts to analyze other systems with high historical growth-work. The analysis should 
target systems and equipment subject to hidden functional failures and currently 
restricted to FF tasks. Systems subject to FF tasks are most at risk to growth-work during 
maintenance availabilities. Second, the Navy maintenance community must strictly 
enforce the collection of maintenance data records for analysis. Historical maintenance 
data associated with the targeted systems should be analyzed. A shift to a hybrid 
preventative maintenance strategy composed of inspection and repair should be 
implemented where data supports. Tanks and voids (T&Vs) are a good candidate for 
initial analysis.  
C. FUTURE EXPLORATION 
The expanded implementation of sensors and diagnostics should be explored in a 
continued effort to move to prognosis and equipment failure forecasting. As sensor 
technology and capability grow, system and equipment material condition analysis 
becomes more affordable and effective. In parallel, the Navy should carefully analyze FF 
inspection data for systems similar to the main gas turbine exhaust system for possible 
design improvements. The frequency of structural cracks may warrant a strengths and 
materials analysis of the exhaust collector design. It may be determined that a backfit 
alteration is not cost effective for in-service ships. However, thermal cyclic loading 
analysis may determine that future ships be built with different material or new thermal 
venting options to reduce cracking. Finally, NASA probabilistic risk analysis methods 
should be evaluated to understand equipment and component reliability further where 
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multiple complex scenarios must be analyzed to understand a system fault fully. The 
correct maintenance recommendation made the first time is essential to avoiding rework. 
Understanding complex system reliability will aid in the appropriate planning and 
execution of system repair.  
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